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INTRODUCTION
The one-voice doctrine is a mainstay of U.S. foreign rela1
tions jurisprudence. It has appeared in some of the Supreme
Court’s most prominent foreign affairs cases—cases addressing
the allocation of foreign relations authority among the Presi2
dent, Congress, the courts, and the states. In the 2011 Term
alone, the doctrine appeared in two cases: Arizona v. United
States, in which the Court analyzed the preemption of Arizona’s
3
controversial immigration laws, and Zivotofsky v. Clinton, in
which the Court found justiciable a dispute between the executive and Congress concerning the status of Jerusalem as the
4
capital of Israel.
The doctrine maintains that in its external relations the
United States must be able to speak with one voice in order to
achieve its interests and avoid negative responses from other
nations. The doctrine has both intuitive appeal and constitu5
tional moorings. It seems sensible that in dealing with other
1. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S.
Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 979 (2001) (describing “[t]he ‘onevoice’ doctrine” as “a familiar mantra of U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence”).
2. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298
(1994) (power of the President, Congress, and states); Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (power of
the President and courts); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (power of
the courts and states); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936) (power of the President).
3. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012).
4. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438
(2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97
MICH. L. REV. 390, 445 (1998) (“Th[e] one-voice argument has strong intuitive
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nations, the United States must be able to formulate and exe6
cute a cohesive foreign policy, rather than conflicting policies.
Indeed, the Constitution, and especially its allocation of foreign
affairs authority, was motivated in significant part by the central government’s inability under the Articles of Confederation
7
to speak for the nation with one voice. Consistent with its intuitive and constitutional underpinnings, the one-voice doctrine
captures, from certain perspectives, valuable principles.
Nonetheless, the doctrine’s contributions are outweighed
by its wide-ranging flaws. Given relatively scant scholarly attention to the doctrine, these flaws have gone underappreciated. This Article provides the first comprehensive assessment of
the doctrine, exposing the doctrine’s several failings.
First, the doctrine is used to address divergent questions
concerning the allocation of foreign affairs authority. A failure
to recognize the different contexts in which the doctrine applies
has led to bleed over from contexts in which the constitutional
justification for the doctrine is strong into those in which that
justification is weak, shifting authority to actors—namely, the
President—whose constitutional claim as the nation’s voice in
foreign affairs is disputed. Second, the doctrine masks different
theories of constitutional interpretation, leading to a lack of
transparency in the Court’s assessment of the allocation of foreign affairs authority. Third, while the doctrine partially captures constitutional principles, it is in key respects inconsistent
with constitutional text, structure, and history. Fourth, the
doctrine diverges from actual practice of the President, Conappeal.”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the “One-Voice”
Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WORLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 44 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991) [hereinafter Steinhardt, Orthodoxy] (“The ideal of a unified foreign policy has a powerful hold on
the popular mind . . . .”).
6. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 445–46 (discussing reasons for the onevoice doctrine’s intuitive appeal while arguing that the appeal decreases when
the federal government addresses traditionally domestic matters through the
treaty power).
7. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 32–46 (2007). This inability had both substantive and procedural
roots. Substantively, the national government lacked authority to negotiate
trade agreements on behalf of the entire U.S. market, to enforce customary
international obligations, and to prevent states from violating treaties. See id.
at 35–45. Procedurally, the national government suffered from the assignment
of foreign policy execution to a multi-person, deliberative body—the Continental Congress. See, e.g., Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President
in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 52–63 (1979).
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gress, Supreme Court, and states. And fifth, the doctrine rests
on functional assumptions that are faulty or incomplete. The
doctrine fails to account, for example, for prudential reasons
why the United States might benefit from more than one voice
in foreign affairs.
This Article exposes each of these failings and considers
8
their implications for the future of this conspicuous doctrine.
Given these failings, one might argue at the outset that it is inappropriate to apply the label “doctrine” to the one-voice rationale. Clearly, the failings identified in this Article ultimately
undermine any notion of a unified, coherent doctrine. At the
same time, the prevalent and uncritical employment of the rationale suggests that it has, to date, been treated as a doctrine
and that this Article is necessary to demote the doctrine to
something less.
The Article begins by discussing in Part I the limited
scholarship on the one-voice doctrine. Part II explores the doctrine’s history, exposing the many contexts in which the doctrine is used. Part III builds on that history to identify the doctrine’s scope. Parts IV through VIII expose each of the abovementioned features of the doctrine. Part IX explains why these
features are flaws and explores the implications of these flaws
for the future of the one-voice doctrine. The Article concludes
that, notwithstanding both its prominence and staying power,
the one-voice doctrine should be abandoned. At best, functional
arguments based on the need for one voice might survive, but
they should be evaluated for what they are—arguments that
the particular circumstances of a case call for one voice, rather
than the dictates of a compelling doctrine. Even in this downgraded form, the doctrine’s value is questionable as the judici-

8. Other, related failings, might also be identified. For example, at least
when used to police state action bearing on foreign affairs, the one-voice doctrine arguably lacks clear content, leading to inconsistency of result. See
Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984; Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism:
State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1150–54
(2000). To illustrate, in Zschernig, the Court struck an Oregon statute notwithstanding the executive department’s lack of concern that the statute as
applied would interfere with foreign affairs. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
432, 434–35, 440–41 (1968). By contrast, in Barclays Bank, the Court upheld a
California tax law notwithstanding executive opposition and outcry from foreign states. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320, 324
& n.22, 327–31 & n.30 (1994); see also Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984. But cf.
infra note 46 (discussing the executive department’s inconsistent opposition to
the California tax methodology at issue).
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ary lacks the competence to evaluate such functional one-voice
arguments.
I. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP ANALYZING THE ONE-VOICE
DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the important issues to which it is addressed, the one-voice doctrine has received little focused attention in the scholarship. No scholar has looked critically at the
9
doctrine as a whole. Only Sarah Cleveland, in a colloquium ar9. For passing criticism of the doctrine, see, for example, Bradley, supra
note 5, at 445–48 (noting empirical and doctrinal weaknesses of the one-voice
doctrine); Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 130–34 (2009) (noting the one-voice doctrine’s
inconsistency with the Constitution and practice and the lack of justification
in goals of accountability and avoidance of embarrassment); Julian G. Ku, The
State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 464, 475–76, 527–29 (2004) (noting that
longstanding state participation in compliance with international law undercuts the Supreme Court’s one-voice pronouncements both empirically and
functionally); Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189,
2195–200 (2001) (criticizing the doctrine on normative and descriptive
grounds); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941, 964–65 (2004) (criticizing as empirically false “the ‘single voiced’ rationale” for treating foreign affairs cases as political questions); Michael D.
Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
555, 561–64 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Non-preemptive] (“The ‘one voice’ in
foreign affairs has always been more of a slogan than a constitutional reality.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1150 (noting the doctrine’s unpredictability, lack
of textual support in the Constitution, and failure to adequately identify the
distribution of federal foreign affairs authority); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out
the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 449–50
(2002) (criticizing the one-voice doctrine, among other things, because of historical comfort with federal and state court application of customary international law as general law).
Ralph Steinhardt provides a more in-depth analysis of what he calls the
“‘one voice’ metaphor,” which he asserts underlies “doctrines of judicial diffidence” that restrict the judiciary from resolving international human rights
claims. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 23–31. These doctrines include
act of state, political question, immunity, self-execution, private right of action, and international comity. Id. at 29–31. Ultimately, Steinhardt argues for
“[a] qualified version of the ‘one-voice’ orthodoxy” that would apply “when the
political branches have actually committed the United States internationally
pursuant to a delegated and exclusive power in the Constitution, when there
are no international standards to apply, and when individual rights are not at
issue.” Id. at 44. Steinhardt’s focus is at once wider and narrower than that of
this Article. On one hand, Steinhardt identifies a broad one-voice metaphor
that assertedly underlies an array of doctrines. This Article, by contrast, focuses on the one-voice doctrine and perceives the various doctrines of diffidence that Steinhardt identifies as tending to undercut the one-voice doctrine
because they limit, rather than preclude, judicial involvement in foreign af-
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ticle, has endeavored anything along those lines. In that piece,
Cleveland made two principal contributions. She described the
11
one-voice doctrine’s inconsistency with the Constitution. And
she documented ways in which the doctrine does not cohere
12
with actual practice. At this point it is clear that, notwithstanding the federal government’s claim as the one voice in foreign affairs, states take many actions affecting foreign affairs
that are tolerated and sometimes encouraged by the national
13
government. Similarly, although the President is often identified as the one U.S. voice in foreign affairs, Congress and the
14
courts are far from mute. This Article builds on these insights
to offer a comprehensive analysis of the failings of the one-voice
doctrine that formalizes its multiple dimensions, identifies its
conflicting theoretical footings, expands on its constitutional
and practical infirmities, documents its functional failings, and
ultimately tracks the implications of these failings to the doctrine’s demise.
II. CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF THE ONE-VOICE
DOCTRINE
The one-voice doctrine applies along multiple axes: it is
used to patrol state action bearing on foreign affairs, to decide
the propriety of judicial resolution of foreign affairs questions,
and to assess the scope of presidential foreign affairs power or
fairs. For example, the act of state doctrine requires the judiciary to presume
the validity of only certain acts by foreign governments. See infra text accompanying notes 286–89; cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 29 (recognizing, for example, that the act of state doctrine does not limit judicial involvement in all foreign affairs cases, while also suggesting that “the contours of
the doctrine might be determined by its ‘one-voice’ purpose”). On the other
hand, this Article assesses the one-voice doctrine as it applies across its various dimensions rather than focus, as Steinhardt does, on relations between
the judiciary and the political branches. See infra Part III.
10. See generally Cleveland, supra note 1.
11. See id. at 984–85, 988–91.
12. See id. at 975–76, 979, 985–89, 991–1014. Others have also noted this
inconsistency. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 446 (“It is likely . . . that the
one-voice metaphor has never been very accurate.”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1634–39,
1688 (1997) (noting both state action affecting foreign affairs and the fact that
“[t]he federal government itself rarely speaks with one voice in foreign relations”).
13. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 975–76, 979, 989–1014; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1674–78; Ku, supra note 9, at 476–526.
14. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 985–89; Goldsmith, supra note
12, at 1688–89.
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the relative power of Congress and the President. Along these
axes, the doctrine surfaces in many contexts. This Part, which
15
provides a brief history of the doctrine and identifies the
many contexts in which it is applied, employs the doctrine’s
main axes (state power, judicial power, and relative power of
the political branches) as organizing principles. The next Part
explores these and other axes in the course of highlighting a
critical, and ultimately troubling, feature of the one-voice doctrine: its many dimensions.
A. STATE POWER
The one-voice doctrine has played the most consistent role
in delineating the proper scope of state action bearing on foreign affairs. The doctrine’s roots stretch at least as far back as
16
the 1827 case of Brown v. Maryland, in which the Supreme
Court struck a state law for encroaching on the federal power
17
to regulate foreign commerce. Since that time, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the states have no role to play in
18
foreign affairs. The Court has stated, for example, that “for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign na15. In exploring that history, the Article focuses, albeit not exclusively, on
historical invocation of the doctrine, rather than on the broader history of the
three questions the doctrine has been used to answer. A history exploring the
foreign affairs powers of the political branches, judiciary, and states is a multivolume project beyond the scope of this Article.
16. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). The Supreme Court’s approach to the
compatibility of state taxes with the Commerce Clause has changed since
Brown. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–83
(1995); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309–10 (1992).
17. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 445–49, 459; see Cleveland, supra note
1, at 980. In a prior, domestic case addressing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear certain appeals from state courts, the Court noted that “the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing [the American
people’s] interests in [matters of war, peace, and commerce] is the government
of the Union.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821).
18. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 980–84 (tracing judicial recognition of
the federal government’s exclusive control of foreign affairs to the early
1800s); Ku, supra note 9, at 466–68 (discussing the Supreme Court’s frequent
endorsement of “a nationalist conception that assumes the exclusion of states
from any activities relating to foreign affairs”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1129–
30 & n.3, 1221 n.331 (collecting cases noting federal exclusivity in foreign affairs). Until recently, scholars shared the Supreme Court’s view. See, e.g.,
Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1015
(2001) (“[R]evisionist scholars have challenged the previously dominant view
that States have no place in foreign affairs.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1129
(“Everyone used to agree that state and local governments had no role to play
in U.S. foreign relations.”).
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tions, we are but one people, one nation, one power”; that “in
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disap20
pear. . . . [and] the State . . . does not exist”; and that “[p]ower
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
21
the national government exclusively.”
In making conclusions of this sort, the Court has relied
heavily on the one-voice doctrine. The doctrine’s prominence is
evidenced by the fact that the doctrine surfaces across genres of
preemption. For example, in enforcing the Constitution’s Import-Export Clause, which generally prohibits states from lay22
ing “Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,” the Court,
since 1976, has asked whether the challenged state law interferes with the national government’s ability to “speak with one
23
voice when regulating” foreign commerce. The doctrine has al24
so informed whether state law is preempted by statute or by
25
executive agreement. The doctrine has even led to preemption
19. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (quoting Chae Chang Ping, 130
U.S. at 606).
20. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also id.
(“[C]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government
and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part
of the several states.”).
21. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); see also id. at 242
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In our dealings with the outside world, the
United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the
complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of
political power between the national government and the individual states.”).
But cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514–15 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Even in its international relations,
the Federal Government must live with the inconvenient fact that it is a Union of independent States, who have their own sovereign powers.”).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
23. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1976); see also
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 853 (1996); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 62, 76–77 (1993); Limbach v.
Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 359–60 (1984); Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n
of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752–54, 758 (1978).
24. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375, 380–86
(2000). While Crosby might be interpreted as preempting state law based solely on conflict with a statutory command that the President speak for the United States in developing a multilateral strategy on Burma, the opinion arguably invokes the President’s, or federal government’s, role as the nation’s voice
as well. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 1012–13 (“[T]he [Crosby] Court’s reliance on the ‘one-voice’ doctrine was sufficiently broad that the Court might
have reached the same conclusion in the absence of [a f]ederal . . . [s]tatute.”).
25. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327, 330 (concluding that an executive
agreement recognizing the Soviet government and assigning to the United
States Soviet claims to nationalized property trumped any conflicting state
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based on executive policy derived from executive agreements.
And, as discussed more fully below, the doctrine has justified
preemption on dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and
27
dormant foreign affairs grounds. In short, the one-voice doctrine has, for years and across preemption categories, played a
notable role in the prohibition of state foreign affairs activity.
B. POWER OF THE JUDICIARY VIS-À-VIS THE POLITICAL
BRANCHES
The history of the one-voice doctrine’s role in fixing the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the political
branches has unfolded largely in the litigation context. No single type of case captures the history, however. Instead, the doctrine has played a role in two principal categories of cases: (1)
cases addressing the political question doctrine or, relatedly,
recognizing the need for some level of judicial respect for political branch determinations, and (2) cases addressing dormant
preemption under the Foreign Commerce Clause and under
federal foreign affairs authority.
policy as “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] government” in entering the agreement); see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 221–23,
226–34. The Pink Court affirmed Belmont and upheld the same executive
agreement in the face of contrary state law and policy based in part on “a
modest implied power of the President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations’” to settle the claims of U.S.
nationals in the course of recognizing the Soviet government. Id. at 229 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
26. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Garamendi
Court struck a state law that “interfere[d] with foreign policy of the Executive
Branch, as expressed principally in . . . executive agreements,” id. at 413, relying on the President’s status “as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs,” id. at
414 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
109 (1948)), and the law’s interference with the President’s ability “to speak
for the Nation with one voice,” id. at 424 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381).
But cf. id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (refusing to preempt “[a]bsent a
clear statement [supporting preemption] . . . by the ‘one voice’ to which courts
properly defer in matters of foreign affairs”).
27. See infra Part I.B.2; see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 (“There is, of
course, no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches
on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the
‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government in the first place.” (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964))); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1620–
23 (summarizing “[t]he conventional view . . . that courts . . . . must invalidate
state laws or acts that impermissibly impinge upon the unique federal foreign
relations interest” because “[i]n foreign affairs, the nation must speak with
one voice, not fifty”).
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1. Political Question and Related Cases
The one-voice doctrine has, at times, led the Court to conclude that certain foreign relations issues should be left to the
discretion of the political branches. This conclusion may lead to
a spectrum of deference. On one end of the spectrum, the Court
may treat an issue as a political question. In such cases, if the
political branches contest how the issue should be resolved, the
28
Court will refuse to hear the dispute. If, by contrast, the authoritative political branches have resolved the issue, the Court
29
may defer to, and decide the case based on, that resolution.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 110–13.
29. For example, in Doe v. Braden, the Court faced a land dispute that,
under a treaty between the United States and Spain, would be resolved
against the plaintiff. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 654, 657 (1853). The plaintiff attempted to avoid the force of the treaty by claiming that the King of Spain
lacked authority under Spanish law to annul by treaty the grant under which
the plaintiff asserted title. Id. at 657–58. The Court concluded that this argument presented a political, not judicial, question, based in part on the fact that
“it would be impossible for the executive . . . to conduct our foreign relations
with any advantage to the country . . . if every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on
behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution and laws, to [do
so].” Id. at 657. The U.S. treatymakers had concluded that the Spanish King
acted within his authority, and the Court ruled against the plaintiff on that
ground. Id. at 657–59; see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702–03, 705
(2008) (dismissing habeas petitions of U.S. citizens held in Iraq based in part
on the executive’s assessment of prison conditions in Iraq); Pasquantino v.
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (refusing to second guess the executive’s assessment of the likely foreign relations impact of a wire fraud prosecution involving Canada); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298, 327–31 (1994) (upholding a state tax scheme that had generated foreign
and executive opposition “[g]iven . . . indicia of Congress’ [sic] willingness to
tolerate” the scheme, the political branches’ relative preeminence in foreign
affairs, and Congress’s role as the nation’s voice in foreign commerce); First
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764–70 (1972) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the judiciary need not apply the act of state
doctrine if the executive so concludes); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 756–57 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding “that the
scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive . . .
in . . . foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted” and generally does not extend
to reevaluating the executive’s determination of “the probable impact of disclosure [of sensitive data] on the national security”); cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that the President’s sole organ power supports authority to terminate untrustworthy intelligence agents without judicial review of claimed constitutional violations); id. at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 432–33 (finding the act of state doctrine applicable to dictate the
outcome of—but not preclude jurisdiction over—a claimed violation of international law because independent judicial resolution of the claim would interfere
with the executive’s ability to advocate a change in international law). But cf.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 282 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Where
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Under either scenario, the motivation for the Court’s refusal to
independently adjudicate the question may lie in the one-voice
doctrine. The Court has acknowledged that many “questions
touching foreign relations . . . . uniquely demand single-voiced
30
statement of the Government’s views” and has treated such
31
questions as political. This practice dates to at least 1818,
the [political] question arises in the course of a litigation involving primarily
the adjudication of other issues between the litigants, the Court accepts as a
basis for adjudication the political departments’ decision of it. But where [the
question’s] determination is the sole function to be served by the exercise of
the judicial power, the Court will not entertain the action.”).
30. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; see also Waterman, 333 U.S. at 104, 111–12,
114 (concluding that decisions made by the President on citizen applications
for authorization “to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation” are
political and therefore non-justiciable based in part on the President’s status
“as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs”).
31. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 281 & n.11 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(listing these and other “cases concerning war or foreign affairs” that have
been dismissed based on “the necessity of the country’s speaking with one
voice in such matters”); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947) (“[T]he question whether a [foreign] state is in a position to perform its treaty obligations
is essentially a political question.”); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588–89
(1943) (holding that courts are bound by immunity decisions of “the Department of State, the political arm of the Government charged with the conduct of
our foreign affairs”); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913) (recognizing a
“plain [judicial] duty” to enforce a voidable extradition treaty after “[t]he executive department . . . elected to waive any right to” void the treaty); Terlinden
v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (“[T]he question whether power remains in a
foreign State to carry out its treaty obligations is . . . political and not judicial,
and . . . the courts ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political
department in that regard.”); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)
(“Who is the sovereign . . . of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges . . . .”); Kennett v. Chambers,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (explaining that the judiciary could not recognize a newly independent state “before she was recognized as such by the treaty-making power” as to do so would be to exercise a “political authority . . .
which the Constitution has conferred exclusively upon another department”);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (reasoning “that
when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations,” declares that certain territory lies outside the sovereignty of a
foreign power, that determination “is conclusive on the judicial department,”
whether or not the executive is right, as “[n]o well regulated government has
ever sanctioned a principle so unwise, and so destructive of national character” as to allow the executive and judiciary to disagree on such important
questions); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 63–64 (1819) (citing
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), for the rule that U.S.
courts must regard as lawful those acts permitted in war by feuding states
when the United States has recognized the war but remained neutral); Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 634–35 (noting that “[t]hose questions which respect
the rights of a part of a foreign empire . . . [that] is contending for its inde-
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though the Court did not expressly use one-voice language in
32
these political question cases until the mid-1900s.
This does not mean “that every case or controversy which
33
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” As
noted, just recently in Zivotofsky the Supreme Court concluded
that a dispute between the President and Congress regarding
the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was justiciable
notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s one-voice argument to the
34
contrary in dissent. In light of Zivotofsky, the current trajectory is arguably toward a greater judicial role, and thus more
35
voices, in resolving disputes touching on foreign affairs.
In harmony with this trend in cases implicating the political question doctrine, the one-voice doctrine leads to lesser
36
shades of deference in other cases. The Zadvydas v. Davis
case in the foreign relations area of immigration exemplifies
this end of the deference spectrum. The Zadvydas Court implied a statutory limitation on the government’s ability to de37
tain aliens who had been ordered removed. In so doing, the
Court rejected the government’s argument that “a federal habeas court would have to accept the Government’s view about
whether the implicit statutory limitation is satisfied in a particular case, conducting little or no independent review of the
38
matter.” Instead, the Court merely recognized the need to
pendence” are generally political and should be addressed not by the courts
but by those “to whom are entrusted all [the nation’s] foreign relations”).
32. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (noting that many issues touching on foreign affairs present political questions because they “uniquely demand singlevoiced statement of the Government’s views”); id. at 281 & n.11 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (noting “cases concerning war or foreign affairs” that have been
dismissed based on “the necessity of the country’s speaking with one voice in
such matters”); Waterman, 333 U.S. at 104, 111–12, 114 (concluding that decisions made by the President on citizen applications for authorization “to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation” are political and therefore
non-justiciable based in part on the President’s status “as the Nation’s organ
for foreign affairs”); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208–09, 215 (1948)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding that the Supreme Court could not review
decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East because the
decision to create the Tribunal was a political one within the President’s ultimate authority as Commander in Chief and as “sole organ of the United States
in the field of foreign relations”).
33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
34. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotosfsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27,
1430 (2012); id. at 1438 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 280–84.
36. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
37. Id. at 699.
38. Id.
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conduct its review with sensitivity to, among other things, “the
39
Nation’s need to ‘speak with one voice.’” The one-voice doctrine thus extracted only relatively weak deference to the exec40
utive’s immigration judgments.
2. Dormant Preemption
Just as the one-voice doctrine has supported varying degrees of judicial deference to political branch authority, the doctrine has influenced how aggressively the judiciary polices and
preempts state action bearing on foreign affairs in the absence
of political branch action. Use of the doctrine for dormant
preemption bears both on the division of authority between the
federal government and the states (as noted above), and the
41
role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the political branches. The judiciary has principally engaged in dormant preemption informed
by the one-voice doctrine under two federal powers: federal
commerce authority and federal foreign affairs authority.
As cases from the 1800s and early 1900s reflect, the Court
has long justified dormant preemption of state laws regulating
42
foreign commerce on the need for national uniformity. In
1979, the Court expressly adopted a one-voice standard that
state taxes bearing on foreign commerce must satisfy to escape

39. Id. at 700.
40. See id.
41. What dormant preemption says about the role of the judiciary vis-àvis the political branches may not be consistent. On one hand, dormant
preemption might reflect not judicial usurpation of “federal prerogatives,” but
judicial preservation of those prerogatives “for exclusive exercise by the political branches.” See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1246. On the other hand, at least
when courts preempt notwithstanding evidence of political branch acceptance
of state action, dormant preemption suggests an independent role for the
courts in foreign affairs.
42. See Bd. of Trs. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (noting that
“[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade
the people of the United States act through a single government with unified
and adequate national power” and concluding that allowing states “to import
commodities for their own use” without compliance with federal law “would
undermine, if not destroy, the single control which it was one of the dominant
purposes of the Constitution to create”); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S.
259, 273 (1875) (reasoning that issues in foreign commerce that “may be, and
ought to be, the subject of a uniform system or plan” do not permit of state
regulation, even if there might be other aspects of foreign commerce that could
be regulated by the states until addressed by treaty or statute); Cooley v. Bd.
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (upholding a state pilotage
law while explaining that Congress’s commerce power is exclusive as to subjects that “are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system”).
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43

preemption. Because “[f]oreign commerce is preeminently a
matter of national concern” that requires “federal uniformity,”
the Court concluded that “a state tax on the instrumentalities
of foreign commerce” must not “prevent[] the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating commer44
cial relations with foreign governments.’” The Court has
struck state taxes, and other burdens on foreign commerce, for
45
violating this one-voice requirement. At the same time, where
Congress or the broader federal government has expressed
comfort with multiple voices, the Court has allowed state taxes
to stand. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, for example, the Court upheld a state tax scheme under
46
the one-voice standard, notwithstanding executive branch and
43. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451
(1979).
44. Id. at 448–51 (quoting, with slight alteration, Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). “[A] state tax at variance with federal policy
will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues
which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive.” Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
45. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84, 92–93 &
n.7 (1984) (striking a state regulation requiring partial processing of “timber
taken from state lands” before export where Congress had not unmistakably
indicated a desire to exempt the regulation from dormant preemption, reasoning that the need “for affirmative [congressional] approval [was] heightened by
the fact that” the state provision impacted foreign relations, which calls for “a
consistent and coherent federal policy”); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 436, 453–54
(holding unconstitutional a California tax as applied to “foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of international commerce” because the tax,
among other things, contravened “a national policy to remove impediments to
the use of containers” in international trade and thus “prevent[ed] the Federal
Government from ‘speaking with one voice’”); see also Container Corp., 463
U.S. at 201–05 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that California’s franchise tax methodology should be preempted under the one-voice standard in
light of the threat and occurrence of foreign protest and the executive’s position expressed in a related, pending case); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,
280 (1875) (rejecting a California statute requiring a bond for certain passengers identified by the California Commissioner of Immigration as intruding
on, among other things, Congress’s foreign commerce power which “belongs
solely to the national government” lest states “embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations”).
46. The executive’s opposition to California’s tax methodology was not
constant. While the executive opposed California’s scheme by introducing
preemptive legislation, writing letters to California’s governor and the Senate
Finance Committee Chair, and submitting amicus briefs, the Solicitor General
urged the Supreme Court to uphold the tax assessments at issue in Barclays
Bank, notwithstanding foreign opposition, because “federal officials had not
articulated a policy opposing” state use of California’s approach “during the
years [therein] at issue.” See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512
U.S. 298, 328–30 & nn.30, 32 (1994); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1159.
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foreign opposition, because Congress had tolerated the
47
scheme.
The one-voice doctrine has played a role in dormant
preemption not only under the Foreign Commerce Clause, but
under the federal government’s more general foreign affairs
48
power. The Court endorsed dormant preemption of this variety (without expressly using one-voice language) in 1968 in
49
Zschernig v. Miller. In Zschernig, the Court concluded that an
Oregon statute regulating inheritance rights of nonresident al50
iens was “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress” and struck the statute even though the executive
was unconcerned by the statute’s application to the petitioners
and the statute addressed an area of traditional state regula51
tion. The law, the Court found, “illustrate[d] the dangers
47. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 302–03, 320, 324, 326–31 (upholding
California’s “worldwide combined reporting” method for assessing “the state
corporate franchise tax” owed by two multinational enterprises); see also Itel
Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1993) (upholding a
state tax because the federal government had indicated the tax did not disrupt
the nation’s capacity to project a uniform voice); Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9–13 (1986) (upholding a state tax against a onevoice challenge because the federal government had adopted a policy permitting such taxation); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193–97 (concluding that California’s franchise tax methodology did not violate “the ‘one voice’ standard”
where it did not seriously threaten foreign retaliation or U.S. foreign policy,
and did not contravene an express federal directive); cf. Ray v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978) (upholding a Washington “tug-escort requirement for [certain] vessels” in Puget Sound because the rules for “entering a
particular body of water” do not demand national uniformity (emphasis added)).
48. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1637 (noting that the Foreign Commerce Clause’s “one-voice test is functionally identical to dormant foreign relations preemption”).
49. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Prior to Zschernig, the Court had rejected as “far
fetched” the notion that a similar state inheritance law would be deemed facially unconstitutional as a state intrusion on federal foreign affairs power
where the state law addressed a matter of traditional state regulation and had
only “incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.” See Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503, 516–17 (1947).
50. The statute provided that a nonresident alien could inherit Oregon
property to the same extent as a U.S. citizen only if the alien could prove that
a U.S. citizen would have “a reciprocal right” to inherit under the laws of the
alien’s country of nationality, that the U.S. citizen would be able to receive the
inherited property in the United States, and that the alien’s government
would not confiscate the inherited property. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31.
51. Id. at 430–35, 440; see also id. at 442–43 (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing foreign affairs as “a domain of exclusively federal competence,” as “an
area where the Constitution contemplates that only the National Government
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which are involved if each State . . . is permitted to establish its
52
own foreign policy.” While Zschernig’s dormant preemption
53
has received play in the lower courts, the Supreme Court has
cast doubt on its current standing. In American Insurance Ass’n
54
v. Garamendi, the majority suggested that the approach endorsed by the two Justices who did not join the Zschernig ma55
jority might be proper under certain circumstances. And the
Garamendi dissent noted that the Court had “not relied on
Zschernig since it was decided,” and suggested that Zschernig’s
“dormant foreign affairs preemption” is most appropriate
“when a state action reflect[s] a state policy critical of foreign
56
governments and involve[s] sitting in judgment on them.” In
light of opinions like Garamendi and Barclays Bank, the trend
in dormant preemption generally appears to be shifting away
57
from judicial policing of state action affecting foreign affairs.
The Court thus seems to be moving toward greater involvement
in foreign relations in the political question context, but away
from such involvement through dormant preemption.
C. RELATIVE POWERS OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
In the relationship between the political branches, the onevoice doctrine has largely, though not exclusively, been used to
expand presidential power. The Court’s most famous invocation
of one-voice principles in this context occurred in United States
shall operate,” and as a project “entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government”); cf. id. at 441–42 (noting a willingness to go further than
the Court and hold the statute unconstitutional on its face).
52. Id. at 441 (majority opinion).
53. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1638–39 & n.97.
54. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). Garamendi concerned the constitutionality of a
California statute that required insurance companies doing business in the
state to disclose information about European insurance policies that were in
effect before and after World War II to facilitate recovery on policies by Holocaust victims. Id. at 401, 409–10, 412. The law was successfully challenged as
inconsistent with the policy reflected in executive agreements President Clinton entered into to address the problem of Holocaust victim insurance policies
that were not properly paid. See id. at 401, 405–08, 413.
55. See id. at 417–20. That is, the Court suggested that field preemption—
the Zschernig majority’s approach—might be appropriate “[i]f a State were
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to
be addressing a traditional state responsibility,” whereas conflict preemption—the Zschernig minority’s approach—would govern where the state had
acted in an area of traditional state competence. See id. at 419 n.11.
56. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164
(2d ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See infra note 301.
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v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a case in which Congress had
authorized the President to criminalize certain arms sales to
58
the South American states involved in the Chaco War. Citing
John Marshall’s fabled speech while he was a member of the
59
House of Representatives, the Court in Curtiss-Wright designated the President as “the sole organ of the federal govern60
ment in the field of international relations.” Descriptions of
the President as the “sole organ” or “nation’s organ” in foreign
affairs slightly alter the one-voice metaphor but substantively
61
form part of the one-voice doctrine. Curtiss-Wright thus energized the doctrine in a powerful way.
Curtiss-Wright has been discredited in many ways, includ62
ing for its reliance on Marshall’s speech. Nonetheless, its sole
63
organ dictum has defied demise. Unsurprisingly, the execu64
tive has claimed the sole organ mantle with vigor. In opinion
after opinion, the U.S. Office of Legal Counsel, Attorney General, and State Department have justified executive authority
58. 299 U.S. 304, 311–15 (1936).
59. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800); see also 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 458–75 (describing Marshall’s speech and the
Thomas Nash extradition controversy to which it was addressed); Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 140–42 (2007) (same).
60. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20.
61. See, e.g., United States. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (finding
that “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal]
government” when recognizing and settling U.S. nationals’ claims against the
Soviet government); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting Marshall’s sole
organ language in support of the proposition that “the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation”); Cleveland, supra
note 1, at 981 (“That the United States should speak with one voice through
the President . . . was the animating principle . . . behind the Court’s landmark . . . decision in Curtiss-Wright.”).
62. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION
94–95 & nn.121–23, 127 (1990) (describing and citing criticism of CurtissWright); Fisher, supra note 59, at 140–43 (explaining that, consistent with his
later opinions on the Supreme Court, Marshall was not advocating “an independent, [exclusive,] inherent presidential power over external affairs,” but
that the President could “act as the channel for communicating with other nations” and implement an extradition treaty, absent congressional imposition of
a different procedure, under his constitutional duty to execute the law).
63. As Anthony Simones put it, “for every scholar who hates CurtissWright, there seems to exist a judge who loves it.” Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 415 (1996).
64. This is not to suggest that the executive always prefers to go it alone.
See, e.g., infra note 245 and accompanying text. In negotiating international
agreements, for example, the executive’s negotiating strength may improve on
the existence of another voice. See infra text accompanying notes 367–72.
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65

on one-voice grounds. Likewise, the executive has repeatedly
invoked its power as the nation’s organ in litigation on a wide
66
range of issues. As Harold Koh put it, “[a]mong government
65. See, e.g., Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/nsa-white-paper.pdf (recognizing the
presidential power “to conduct[, through the National Security Agency,] warrantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect and
disrupt armed attacks on the United States”); Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law to Use Military Force Against Iraq, 26
Op. O.L.C. 143, 150–51 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/
milit-force-iraq.pdf (advising that the President has the power to “take military action [against terrorist organizations and the countries that support
them] to protect the national security interests of the United States”); Whistleblower Protections for Classified Disclosures, 22 Op. O.L.C. 92, 95 (1998)
(recognizing the presidential power to keep national security data from Congress); Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic
Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21–22, 28 (1996), available at http://www.justice
.gov/olc/gray.11.htm (recognizing the presidential power to control communications with other countries and to decide U.S. policy concerning the “Arab
League passport policy”); Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
Override International Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13
Op. O.L.C. 163, 168 (1989) (recognizing the presidential authority to violate
customary international law); Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential
Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea, 12 Op. O.L.C. 238, 238 (1988)
(recognizing the presidential power to “extend the [U.S.] territorial sea from
three to twelve miles”); International Load Line Convention, 40 Op. Att’y Gen.
119, 123 (1941) (recognizing the presidential authority to declare a treaty inoperative); LOUIS FISHER, STUDY NO. 1: THE “SOLE ORGAN” DOCTRINE 1–2
(2006), available at http://loufisher.org/docs/pip/441.pdf (citing additional examples from the Office of Legal Counsel as well as examples from the State
Department); Letter from Edward H. Levi, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Nelson A.
Rockefeller, U.S. Vice President (June 13, 1975), in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 240, 249 (1975) (criticizing proposed legislation that would require the executive to transmit executive agreements to Congress for either
House to veto within a certain period as potentially impairing the President’s
sole organ powers).
66. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 19–21, Kiyemba v.
Obama, 559 U.S. 1005 (2010) (No. 09-581), 2010 WL 638462, at *19–21 (arguing, on one-voice grounds, against judicial interference with executive management of detainee transfers from Guantánamo); Brief for Petitioners at 26,
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (No. 03-358), 2004 WL
250237, at *26 (“[S]ubjecting the President’s conduct of international diplomacy to the procedural requirements of [the National Environmental Policy Act]
would impair the President’s ability to ‘speak for the Nation with one voice’ . . .
.” (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)));
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Ins.
Ass’n v. Garamendi at *10–21, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722), 2003 WL
721754, at 10–21 (arguing for preemption of a state law that interfered with
the President’s ability to speak with a single voice); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 510 U.S. 681
(1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 WL 448091, at *8–9 (citing, among other things,
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attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is so often quoted that it has come to be known as
67
the ‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite.” The Supreme Court has
68
endorsed this line of argument in various cases, strengthening
the President’s role as sole organ in foreign affairs in arguing for a stay of civil
litigation against the President based on pre-office conduct); Reply Brief for
the Petitioners, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)
(No. 92-344), 1993 WL 290141, at *2–4 (arguing against judicial review of a
presidential “policy of interdiction and repatriation of Haitian migrants on the
high seas” in part on the grounds that judicial review would interfere “with
the President’s ability to speak with one voice” and would “seriously prejudice
the national interest”); Brief for the United States at 13–17, New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Nos. 1873, 1885) (citing the President’s sole organ status in asserting that the executive has the power “to protect the nation against publication of [national security] information”); Brief
for the United States at 31–57, United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U.S.
296 (1955) (No. 14) (relying on the President’s sole organ power in asserting
presidential authority to enter a commercial executive agreement). In addition
to the executive, other entities have made one-voice arguments in the President’s favor. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Justice & European Centre for Law and Justice Supporting Respondents at 11–
12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 467691,
at *11–12 (citing the President’s status as sole organ in arguing for judicial
deference to the President’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions); Brief
of Citizens for the Common Defence as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5–6, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL
683613, at *5–6 (citing the President’s sole organ role to support presidential
“authority to detain a [U.S.] citizen as an enemy combatant”).
The executive has also made the one-voice claim to Congress. See, e.g.,
Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bill Prohibiting the
Export of Technology for the Joint Japan-United States Development of FS-X
Aircraft, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1042, 1043 (July 31, 1989) (asserting that the United
States must speak with one voice in foreign negotiations and claiming that
“[t]he Constitution provides that that one voice is the President’s”); Statement
on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1541, 1541–42 (Dec. 22, 1987) (objecting to certain portions of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act as potentially obstructing the
President’s sole organ responsibilities); Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy
Sec’y of State, Role of the President’s National Security Affairs Assistant,
Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Apr. 17, 1980), in
80 DEP’T ST. BULL., July 1980, at 32, 32–34 (1980) (recognizing a congressional
role in foreign affairs, but opposing, in part on sole organ grounds, a proposal
to subject certain national security appointments to Senate advice and consent).
67. KOH, supra note 62, at 94 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (using Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in the course of deferring to the executive’s assessment of the foreign relations impact of a wire fraud prosecution
involving Canada (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936))); Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)
(recognizing the President’s lead role in foreign affairs and striking down a
state law that prevented the President from “speak[ing] for the Nation with
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one voice” (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (“Th[e] presumption [against extraterritoriality]
has special force when . . . construing treaty and statutory provisions that may
involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.”); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (describing the
President as “the guiding organ in the conduct of our foreign affairs” in upholding the President’s power to remove enemy aliens under the Alien Enemy
Act); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109
(1948) (recognizing that the President has independent constitutional powers
“as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
221–23, 226–34 (1942) (upholding an executive agreement in the face of contrary state law and policy based in part on “a modest implied power of the
President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations’” to settle the claims of U.S. nationals in the course of recognizing a foreign government (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320));
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327, 330–32 (1937) (concluding that
an executive agreement trumped inconsistent state policy where “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] government”
when entering into the agreement); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289
n.17, 306 (1981) (concluding that the executive’s revocation of a passport was
authorized by statute so that it was unnecessary to decide the scope of the
President’s sole organ power); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 715
(1974) (emphasizing the strength of executive privilege claims as to intelligence information that comes to the President because of his role “as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs” (quoting Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111)); David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign
Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 25–27 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“Even when
the sole-organ doctrine has not been invoked by name, its spirit, indeed its talismanic aura, has provided a common thread in a pattern of cases that has exalted presidential power above constitutional norms.”).
Numerous non-majority Supreme Court opinions have also endorsed this
line of argument. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Marshall’s sole organ language to support the President’s preeminence in foreign affairs); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430, 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to the President as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly
defer in matters of foreign affairs,” but concluding that the state law in question “would not compromise the President’s ability to speak with one voice for
the Nation”); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that Congress could prohibit federal judicial review of CIA decisions to terminate untrustworthy employees since the power to make those decisions derives primarily from, and
judicial review would infringe upon, the President’s power as sole organ); id.
at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting serious constitutional doubts that
Congress could—in light of, among other things, the President’s sole organ
power—authorize judicial review of all terminations of CIA intelligence employees); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 551–52 & n.6 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in
the course of highlighting the vast scope of the President’s responsibilities and
the President’s corresponding need for confidentiality of advice and instructions); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–68
(1972) (plurality opinion) (citing Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in support of executive primacy in foreign affairs); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at
727 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright, among other cases, in not-
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the President’s claim to exclusive authority to recognize foreign
governments as well as presidential unilateralism in treaty69
and war-making. Members of Congress have, at times, voiced
70
support for the President’s sole organ status as well.
Interestingly, while Curtiss-Wright is the modern engine
behind the President’s role as the nation’s voice in foreign affairs, Curtiss-Wright was not merely the resurrection (or, more
accurately, the distorted reincarnation) of a historic speech.
The concept of the President as the nation’s organ in foreign afing the executive’s enormous international relations power that is “largely unchecked by” Congress and the courts); id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright, among other cases, in support of the proposition “that the
President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs”); id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Marshall’s sole organ speech and Curtiss-Wright in concluding “that the scope of
the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive . . . [in] foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 679 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
President possesses confidential information “as ‘the Nation’s organ for foreign
affairs’” (quoting Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111)); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197, 208 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright in endorsing
the view that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the United States in the field
of foreign relations”).
69. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of
Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1012–21, 1028–33 & n.113 (2013).
70. For example, in 1906, Senator Spooner defended the President’s power
as “the sole organ of negotiation and of communication between this country
and foreign governments.” 40 CONG REC. 2142–43 (1906) (statement of Sen.
Spooner). Senator Spooner’s words were endorsed by other Senators in the
years that preceded Curtiss-Wright. See, e.g., 60 CONG. REC. 2171 (1921)
(statement of Sen. Connally); 58 CONG. REC. 8011 (1919) (statement of Sen.
Robinson); 58 CONG. REC. 7339–40 (1919) (statement of Sen. Connally). Congressional support for the President’s role as sole organ also appears after
Curtiss-Wright. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 9528–30 (1984) (statement of Rep.
Gingrich) (citing the President’s sole organ status in arguing against congressional interference with the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs); 118 CONG.
REC. 11,839 (1972) (statement of Sen. McGee) (arguing that “more and more of
us should drop out of the business of trying to play Secretary of State or President of the United States” as the Constitution places on the President the
“awesome responsibility” of being the nation’s unified “voice in foreign affairs”); 107 CONG. REC. 1653 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (asserting
that the Constitution wisely establishes the President as the nation’s voice in
foreign affairs); 103 CONG. REC. 1157 (1957) (statement of Rep. Udall) (citing
Marshall’s sole organ speech in resisting congressional limits on the President’s power to carry out U.S. foreign policy, including by military force). But
see, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 14,097 (1970) (statement of Sen. Harris) (noting a
longstanding dispute regarding the scope of the President’s sole organ power
and asserting Congress’s constitutional role in war making); 87 CONG. REC.
1719–20 (1941) (statement of Sen. Wiley) (asserting a constitutional foreign
policy role for Congress notwithstanding Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” language).
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fairs experienced some limited play in the judiciary before
Curtiss-Wright. For example, in a dissenting opinion in 1852,
Justice Nelson relied on Marshall’s speech in concluding that
an extradition “demand must be made . . . . upon the President,
who has charge of all [our] foreign relations, and with whom
only foreign governments are authorized, or even permitted, to
71
hold any communication of a national concern.”
Occasional reliance on the one-voice doctrine also appeared
outside the judiciary. Members of Congress endorsed the Presi72
dent’s role as sole organ before Curtiss-Wright. The executive
likewise asserted the President’s unique role in foreign affairs.
In 1793, Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, wrote the notorious French ambassador, Citizen Genet, to explain that con73
sular commissions should be addressed to the President. As
Jefferson explained, “the President[,] . . . being the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations,
it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to
learn what is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever
he communicates as such, they have a right, and are bound to
consider as the expression of the nation” even if the President
exceeded his authority or another branch of the federal gov74
ernment disagrees. This same reasoning surfaced in April
71. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 137 (1852); see also Williams v.
Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (declaring that “the executive branch of the government . . . is charged with our foreign relations,” including determining the U.S. position regarding sovereignty over foreign territory); Brief on the Questions of Law, and Argument on the Facts for the
Appellant at 37, La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423
(1899) (No. 29) (quoting Marshall’s sole organ speech in arguing that the President, not the courts, must decide how to execute an award issued by the United States-Mexico Claims Commission pursuant to a United States-Mexico
treaty).
72. See supra note 70.
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec’y of State, to Citizen Genet, Minister Plenipotentiary from the Republic of Fr., to the U.S. (Nov. 22, 1793), in
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS RELATIVE
TO FRANCE AND GREAT-BRITAIN 93–94 (1793) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas
Jefferson]; see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 321–23 (2001) [hereinafter
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power] (discussing the interaction with Genet in
greater detail).
74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 73; see also Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 33, 37–38 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) (asserting, in defending Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, that the executive,
not the legislature, is “the organ of intercourse between the UStates [sic] and
foreign Nations”); Galbraith, supra note 69, at 1015 (noting that President
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1861, when Jefferson Davis convened the Confederate Congress
in response to a de facto declaration of war by President Lincoln in order “to devise the measures necessary for the defence
75
of the country.” In addressing the Congress, Davis explained
that he “was not at liberty to disregard” President Lincoln’s
declaration of war against the Confederacy, notwithstanding
the fact “that under the Constitution of the United States the
President was usurping a power granted exclusively to the congress,” because the President “is the sole organ of communication between [the United States] and foreign powers” and international law did not permit “question[ing] the authority of
76
the Executive of a foreign nation to declare war.” At least from
an external perspective, then, the President possessed power as
the nation’s organ that went beyond merely relaying policy to
making and executing it.
Treatise writers, contemporary to Davis, likewise described
the President as the sole organ for foreign affairs. John Norton
Pomeroy, for example, divided the foreign affairs power “into
two distinct branches: the power of intercourse, intercommunication, and negotiation . . . and the power of entering into . . .
77
international compacts.” As to the first power, “[t]he President
is the sole organ of communication between our own and all
other governments. . . . [and] Congress has absolutely no con78
trol.” While this power to communicate was not, in Pomeroy’s
79
view, as important as the power to make treaties, it was far
from ministerial. As sole organ, “the President [could], without
any possibility of hindrance from the legislature, so conduct the
foreign intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations with other governments, as to force a war,” so that as a result of this power
Grant “vetoed two trivial joint resolutions by Congress—resolutions that simply responded to congratulations sent by foreign nations—on the ground
that . . . the President [is] the agent to represent the national sovereignty in
its intercourse with foreign powers”).
75. Message of Jefferson Davis (Apr. 29, 1861), in 1 THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS 166, 167 (Frank Moore ed., 1861).
76. Id. at 172.
77. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 446 (1868).
78. Id. at 446–47; see also JOEL PARKER, THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 36 & n.* (1862) (explaining that “the intercourse of foreign nations with the United States is through the Executive, and
they are not authorized to go behind his acts, and to allege that they are nugatory,” and citing Davis as someone who understood this); POMEROY, supra note
77, at 446–48 (describing the President’s “untrammeled” power as sole organ).
79. POMEROY, supra note 77, at 446–48.
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“the Executive Department . . . holds in its keeping the safety,
welfare, and even permanence of our internal and domestic in80
stitutions.”
III. SCOPE OF THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE
The foregoing Part illustrates both the historical roots of
the one-voice doctrine and the contexts in which it appears. But
what does it mean to say that an organ of the government is
the nation’s voice? From its name, one might mistakenly assume that the one-voice doctrine merely supports authority to
81
communicate for the United States in international affairs.
Language from Supreme Court precedent nurtures that mistake. Curtiss-Wright spoke of “the President alone [having] the
82
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”
Similarly, Baker v. Carr cited the need in certain circumstances
83
for a “single-voiced statement of the Government’s views.” Of
course, even if the one-voice doctrine only supported a power to
speak, that power might well involve a measure of policymaking discretion. As historical commentators saw it, the power to speak included the power to take positions that could lead
84
the nation to war. Consistent with this understanding, the
doctrine has been understood and used in its different dimensions to support more than mere authority to present the United States’s position.

80. Id. at 447–48; see also CLARENCE ARTHUR BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF
EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 25–42 (1921) (citing Pomeroy, Marshall, and historical evidence in support of the principle that the President’s
sole organ power relating to war “gives the President the whole power of initiating and formulating the foreign policy of the government, and virtually of
committing the nation to its execution”).
81. Cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–
1984, at 207–15, 255 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (discussing the question whether the
President’s role as sole organ of the United States in foreign affairs extends
only to communicating for the United States or to making policy as well);
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 243 (noting that “many
scholars argue that the President is only a spokesperson” with few, enumerated foreign affairs powers).
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(emphasis added); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498
(2012) (emphasizing the listening function by noting that “[i]t is fundamental
that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this
subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States”).
83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (emphasis added).
84. See supra text accompanying note 80.
THE
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Three cases illustrate. In addition to referencing the President’s authority to speak and listen for the United States,
Curtiss-Wright noted that the President “alone negotiates” with
85
other countries and “manages our concerns with foreign na86
tions.” Curtiss-Wright further suggested that the President
87
designs how we will interact with other countries —that is,
makes foreign policy—and perhaps dispositively assesses how
88
certain acts will impact our foreign relations.
Zschernig likewise perceived the one-voice doctrine as involving more than oratory. In Zschernig, the Court rejected an
Oregon statute governing nonresident alien inheritance rights
because the statute, though addressing a matter of traditional
89
state regulation, led to state court assessment and criticism of
90
foreign governments; produced “more than ‘some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries,’” creating “great potential
91
for disruption or embarrassment”; and generated decisions
grounded in foreign policies (especially Cold War opposition to

85. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
86. Id. (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901)).
87. See id. (noting, in discussing the President’s preeminence in foreign
affairs, the need for “unity of design” in relations with other nations (quoting 8
COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901))).
88. See id. at 321 (noting that how or whether the President acts in foreign affairs may depend “upon the effect which his action may have upon our
foreign relations,” something Congress may not be able to anticipate); see also
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (suggesting that the
President’s role as sole organ includes determining potential foreign relations
consequences); Adler, supra note 68, at 26 (“[Curtiss-Wright] infused a purely
communicative role with a substantive policymaking function and thereby
manufactured a great power out of the Marshallian sole-organ doctrine.”).
89. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
90. Id. at 433–37 & nn.6–7, 440; see also id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that the provisions of the state law “necessarily involve the
Oregon courts in an evaluation . . . of the administration of foreign law, the
credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of foreign governments”).
91. Id. at 433–35 (majority opinion) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,
517 (1947)); see also id. at 440–41. But cf. id. at 459 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result) (concluding that, if Oregon could “deny inheritance rights to all
nonresident aliens,” the Oregon statute seemed “wisely designed to avoid any
offense to foreign governments . . . : a foreign government [could] hardly object
to the denial of rights which it does not itself accord to the citizens of other
countries”).
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92

authoritarian states) and conditions. The statute, in the
Court’s words, “illustrate[d] the dangers which are involved if
93
each State . . . is permitted to establish its own foreign policy.”
Zschernig thus indicated that the federal government’s position
as the nation’s voice meant that it had exclusive authority to
94
formulate policy, criticize other states, and affect foreign relations in any significant way. States were precluded from adopting foreign policy even if that policy did not, as in Zschernig,
95
cause concern to the executive or conflict with a federal treaty.
Finally, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles the
Court noted that states might improperly “prevent[] the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice’” by provoking international disputes, triggering retaliation against the entire
96
country, and creating a patchwork of divergent regulations.
Status as the nation’s one voice entailed “the achievement of
97
federal uniformity.” Other opinions similarly indicate that the
92. See id. at 435–39 & n.8 (majority opinion); see also id. at 442 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (noting that Oregon’s law was “framed . . . to the prejudice of
nations whose policies it disapproves”).
93. Id. at 441 (majority opinion).
94. Similarly, the Court in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp. concluded that the President had power to make unreviewable, substantive decisions concerning citizen applications “to engage in
overseas or foreign air transportation,” in part given the President’s status “as
the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs.” 333 U.S. 103, 109–12, 114 (1948); see also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–67
(1972) (plurality opinion) (citing sole organ language and cases “emphasiz[ing]
the lead role of the Executive in foreign policy”).
95. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (noting the executive’s position that
application of the Oregon statute to the plaintiffs in Zschernig did not “unduly
interfere[] with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations” (quoting Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429 (No. 21), 1967
WL 113577, at *6 n.5)); id. at 441 (“[E]ven in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign relations.”); id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring) (further
describing the executive’s position).
96. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450–51, 453
(1979) (quoting, with slight alteration, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)). But cf., e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512
U.S. 298, 327 (1994) (refusing to strike California’s approach to taxation
“[g]iven [certain] indicia of Congress’ [sic] willingness to tolerate” the approach).
97. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added); see also id. at 449–52
& n.14 (speaking of the need for uniformity “in regulating foreign commerce”
(emphasis added)); id. at 453 (noting that a state statute was constitutionally
infirm because it would “frustrate attainment of federal uniformity”); cf.
Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (condemning state interference with the federal government’s
ability to speak with one voice and the resulting interference with the
achievement of federal tax policy).

2014]

BEYOND ONE VOICE

979

need for one voice in foreign affairs justifies authority to make
98
foreign policy. Thus, the one-voice doctrine bears on important
questions regarding authority to make and pursue foreign policy, not simply power to speak or even to negotiate.
Because the doctrine reaches and influences the resolution
of these important questions concerning control of U.S. foreign
affairs, the doctrine’s soundness is of critical concern. As evi99
denced above, the doctrine has some historical support. As
noted below, the doctrine comports to some degree with the
Constitution’s text, structure, and history, especially in its federalist dimension; under certain conditions, the doctrine also
100
makes functional sense. Notwithstanding these virtues, the
doctrine is fatally flawed.
The next five Parts identify features of the one-voice doctrine that ultimately render the doctrine untenable. The reasons that some features are problematic will be obvious; the defectiveness of other features will be less so. The primary
objective of these Parts is to expose the critical features of the
doctrine, not to convince that they are failings. Part IX takes up
98. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012)
(reasoning that the federal government may decide “whether it is appropriate
to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States,” as
“[d]ecisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with
one voice”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003) (stating
that in light of the need for uniformity in dealing with other countries that
motivated the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority, state action
bearing on foreign affairs “must yield to the National Government’s policy”
and there is no “question generally that there is executive authority to decide
what that policy should be”); Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 (speaking of the
need for federal uniformity in regulating foreign commerce); Itel Containers
Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76 (1993) (concluding that a Tennessee
sales tax did “not infringe the Government’s ability to speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with other nations”); Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (discussing when “a state tax at
variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ standard”); id. at 205
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A state] tax that is flatly inconsistent with federal
policy. . . . prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice in a
field that should be left to the Federal Government.”); Ray v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 187–89 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing “[t]he federal interest in uniform regulation of commerce on
the high seas” to justify state law preemption).
Justices O’Connor and Scalia went so far as to suggest that the President’s sole organ power supports authority to terminate untrustworthy intelligence agents without judicial review of alleged constitutional violations. See
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. See supra Part II.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 324–25, 361–64.
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the task of demonstrating why these features are flaws and ultimately support abandonment of the one-voice doctrine.
IV. THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S MULTIPLE
DIMENSIONS
As the history of the one-voice doctrine suggests, the doctrine is invoked along multiple dimensions. On the one hand,
the one-voice doctrine uniformly addresses structural questions
concerning the distribution of foreign affairs authority. On the
other hand, the issues the doctrine is used to resolve are several. Thus, notwithstanding its name, the one-voice doctrine has
multiple faces. Cleveland observed that the one-voice doctrine
“has emerged from two related lines of doctrine: the principle
that states are excluded from international relations, and the
assumption that the President speaks as a soloist for the Unit101
ed States.” This observation merits two addendums. First,
the one-voice doctrine has not escaped its provenance; it continues to address varying structural questions. Second, the doc102
trine has more than two dimensions. The doctrine has three
fairly discrete dimensions as well as hybrids. Of its discrete
dimensions, one sounds in federalism and two in separation of
powers.
A. FEDERALIST DIMENSION
In its federalist, or vertical, dimension, the one-voice doctrine serves to police state involvement in foreign relations on
the ground that the federal government alone may speak in
foreign affairs. The doctrine has been most prominent along
this dimension. “[A] long line of [Supreme Court] decisions . . .
has applied the ‘one-voice’ doctrine to address the validity of
103
state activities impinging on foreign relations.” As noted in
the history provided above, these cases involve the Foreign
Commerce Clause, Import-Export Clause, the federal foreign
affairs power, federal statutes, executive agreements, and ex104
ecutive policies. In all these areas, the preeminence or exclusivity of federal powers touching on foreign affairs result in the
preemption of state law.
101. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 982.
102. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 448–49 (describing a political question
argument as “[a] variation of [the related] one-voice argument”).
103. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 975; see also id. at 979.
104. See supra Part II.A.
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B. SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS
In its horizontal—or federal separation of powers—posture,
the one-voice doctrine applies to two questions: the foreign af105
fairs role of courts vis-à-vis the political branches, and the allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and
106
Congress. As noted above, with regard to the courts’ role in
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has reasoned that some foreign affairs issues present political questions, in part because
they “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Govern107
ment’s views.” Indeed, Justice Frankfurter noted that the
Court’s political question decisions in the area of war and foreign affairs “are usually explained by the necessity of the coun108
try’s speaking with one voice in such matters.” In applying
the political question doctrine, the Court judges that the political branches are the nation’s one voice or at least that the judi109
ciary is not.
105. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1223, 1256 n.139 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Federalism] (“[D]ecisions involving
judicial demurral (including the political question cases) can all be justified on
a variation of the ‘one-voice’ rule.”); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 28
(noting the one-voice metaphor’s relevance to the separation of foreign affairs
powers between the judiciary and political branches).
106. The question whether the President or Congress is authorized to engage in certain foreign affairs acts involves something of a false dichotomy
since the President participates with Congress in lawmaking. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3 (describing bicameralism and presentment). At the same
time, the Constitution casts Congress as the primary lawmaker, as illustrated
by the fact that Congress may enact law on its own through a bicameral, supermajority override of a presidential veto. See id. art. I, § 1 (vesting Congress
with the legislative power delegated to the federal government); id. art. I, § 7,
cl. 2 (detailing Congress’s authority to override a veto).
107. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(finding the political question doctrine applicable and reasoning that “where
foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak
‘with one voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly important” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))); Bradley, supra note 5, at 448–49 (describing a political question
argument as “[a] variation of [the related] one-voice argument”).
108. Baker, 369 U.S. at 281 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That does not
mean that all such decisions rest on the one-voice doctrine. See id. “[C]ertain
of the Court’s [political question] decisions have accorded scant weight to the
consideration of unity of action in the conduct of external relations,” id. at 281
n.11, focusing instead on the fact that certain issues have historically been decided by the political branches on political criteria thus depriving the judiciary
of standards by which to decide the matter, id. at 281–83.
109. Of course, as Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), hints, the political branches may be divided, such that dismissal on political question
grounds prevents the addition of a judicial voice but does not produce a single
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Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Goldwater v. Carter illustrates. Several members of Congress challenged President
111
Carter’s termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
Justice Rehnquist concluded that where the Constitution was
silent regarding the power to terminate a treaty, and the answer might depend on the nature of the treaty, the issue ought
to be left to the political branches, “each of which has resources
112
available to protect and assert its interests.” That conclusion,
he thought, was bolstered by the fact that the question sounded
in foreign relations, where the political question doctrine is
113
particularly appropriate.
The second horizontal dimension of the one-voice doctrine
concerns the distribution of authority between the President
and Congress. As mentioned, Curtiss-Wright provides the par114
adigmatic example here. Although the case concerned the
constitutionality of a joint congressional resolution giving the
President discretion to criminalize certain conduct to achieve
foreign policy objectives, the Court emphasized the President’s
role “as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
115
international relations.” Designation of the President as the
one voice in foreign affairs resulted in part from the need for
“unity of design,” which the President is well suited to
116
achieve.
C. HYBRID DIMENSIONS
In addition to these purely horizontal and vertical dimensions, the one-voice doctrine operates along diagonal, or hybrid,
dimensions. On these dimensions, questions of state law
preemption might be resolved by reference to the allocation of
117
power among the branches of the federal government. Both
voice. See infra text accompanying notes 110–13; see also Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 35.
110. 444 U.S. 996.
111. Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at
1002–05 & n.1; see also Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1441 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the political branches “have nonjudicial methods of working out
their differences”).
113. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003–05.
114. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
115. Id. at 320; see also id. at 319–22.
116. Id. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901)).
117. Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1680 (noting the relevance of federal
separation of powers to federalism questions regarding the preemption of state
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majority and dissenting opinions in Garamendi involve hybrid
118
applications of the doctrine. The majority relied on the President’s need to speak with one voice in foreign relations in decid119
ing to preempt a California law bearing on foreign relations.
That law required insurers doing business in California to disclose “‘insurance policies’ issued ‘to persons in Europe, which
120
were in effect between 1920 and 1945.’” In the majority’s
view, the law conflicted with an executive policy—reflected in
several sole executive agreements—that favored voluntary cooperation with an international commission designed to facili121
tate the settlement of Holocaust related insurance claims. In
finding the California provision preempted, the Court did not
merely focus on the national government’s preeminence in our
122
federalist system but on the President’s preeminence in for123
eign affairs. The Court found that the California law “‘compromise[d] the . . . capacity of the President to speak for the
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments’ to re124
solve” Holocaust-era claims as “California [sought] to use an
law); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
341, 374–79, 401–02, 429 (1999) [hereinafter Ramsey, Original Understanding] (reasoning that preemption of state law based on presidential policy is “an
issue of intrafederal separation of powers” as such preemption expands presidential power).
118. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
119. See id. at 413–17, 420–21, 423–24.
120. Id. at 409 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 13804(a) (West Cum. Supp.
2003)).
121. See id. at 405–08, 413, 420–25.
122. The Court also briefly touched on the allocation of foreign relations
authority between the President and Congress. The Court explained that
while it had not “give[n] policy statements by Executive Branch officials conclusive weight as against an opposing congressional policy” concerning foreign
commerce, it relied on executive policy statements regarding Holocaust-era
claims because “in the field of foreign policy the President has the ‘lead role,’”
while Congress leads in regulating foreign commerce. Id. at 422 & n.12 (citing
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328–30 (1994); First
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972) (plurality
opinion)).
123. See id. at 401, 413–21. The Court’s focus on not just the national government’s, but the President’s, authority resulted from the Court’s refusal to
decide whether field or conflict preemption was necessary to protect the executive’s foreign affairs authority from state intrusion. Id. at 419–20. Rather, the
Court concluded that both field and conflict preemption rendered California’s
law unconstitutional because it conflicted with a valid exercise of executive
foreign policy power. See id. at 419–25.
124. Id. at 424 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 381 (2000)).
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iron fist where the President ha[d] consistently chosen kid
125
gloves.” Thus, while the case concerned the federalist distribution of foreign affairs power, the Court resolved it in part on
separation of powers grounds—that the President can and
126
must be able to speak with one voice in foreign affairs.
Justice Ginsburg in dissent similarly invoked separation of
powers concerns to argue that the California law should
127
stand.
Like the majority, Justice Ginsburg described the
President as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in
128
matters of foreign affairs.” She argued, however, that because
the President had not directly or formally addressed infor129
mation disclosure (the subject of the California provision), the
judiciary improperly assumed the role of “expositor[] of the Nation’s foreign policy” in “preempt[ing] state law[] on foreign af130
fairs grounds.” Upholding the law, by contrast, “would not
compromise the President’s ability to speak with one voice for
131
the Nation” when he decided to address the issue. For the
dissent, then, the distribution of power between the judiciary
132
and political branches foreclosed preemption of the state law.
The hybrid use of the one-voice doctrine is also apparent in
contrasting two cases concerning the Foreign Commerce
Clause. In the older of the two, Japan Line, the Court considered a California tax that resulted in multiple taxation on “foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of internation133
al commerce.”
While the Court noted that the power to
134
regulate foreign commerce is Congress’s, the opinion heavily
emphasized the California tax’s fatal interference with the need
for federal uniformity in regulating commerce with other
135
states. In other words, the Court focused on the federalist
dimension of foreign commerce authority rather than on its
125. Id. at 427.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 442–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 430.
129. See id. (“Absent a clear statement aimed at disclosure requirements
by the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in matters of foreign affairs, I
would leave intact California’s enactment.”); see also id. at 438–43 & n.4.
130. Id. at 442–43.
131. Id. at 442.
132. Id. at 430–42.
133. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 436, 451–52
(1979).
134. See id. at 444, 446, 453–57.
135. See id. at 448–54 (repeatedly referencing the need for national uniformity).
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separation of powers component. In Barclays Bank, by contrast,
136
the Court emphasized the separation of powers dimension.
Like Japan Line, Barclays Bank involved California taxation: California’s use of a “worldwide combined reporting”
method to assess “the state corporate franchise tax due” from
137
multinational entities. Relying on Japan Line, the Court and
petitioners emphasized the need for national uniformity in reg138
ulating foreign commerce. Moreover, there were grounds for
concluding that California’s approach prevented that uniformity. California’s approach differed from the approaches of both
139
other states and the federal government. A “battalion of foreign governments . . . marched to [foreign petitioner’s] aid, deploring [California’s approach] in diplomatic notes, amicus
140
briefs, and even retaliatory legislation.” And the executive
had opposed California’s approach through nonbinding “actions, statements, and amicus filings,” including introducing
141
preemptive legislation. Nonetheless, the Court upheld Cali142
fornia’s approach as applied,
reasoning that Congress’s
143
“voice, in this area, is the Nation’s” and Congress had indi144
cated a “willingness to tolerate” California’s methodology. In
136. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330–31
(1994).
137. Id. at 302.
138. See id. at 302–03, 311, 320–31.
139. See id. at 303–07.
140. Id. at 320; see also id. at 324 & n.22, 328; id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 328–30 & n.30 (majority opinion). But cf. Itel Containers Int’l
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1993) (relying on “various conventions, statutes, and regulations” adopted by the federal government as well as
an amicus brief from the United States to conclude that a state tax did “not
infringe the Government’s ability to speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with other nations”); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 195–96 (1983) (interpreting perceived executive silence as
suggesting that a state tax did “not seriously threaten[]” U.S. foreign policy,
and upholding the state tax); supra note 46 (explaining that the executive’s
opposition to California’s tax methodology was not constant).
142. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 303, 327.
143. Id. at 331; see also id. at 324 (describing Congress as “the branch responsible for the regulation of foreign commerce”); id. at 329 (describing Congress as “the preeminent speaker” with regard to the regulation of foreign
commerce).
144. Id. at 327; see also id. at 326 (concluding “that Congress implicitly has
permitted the States to use” California’s methodology); id. at 330 (describing
California’s law as “congressionally condoned”); cf. Huddleston, 507 U.S. at 85
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on an amicus brief
from the executive because “the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
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reaching this conclusion, the Court also noted that it was not
for the judiciary to strike California’s law in the face of con145
gressional acquiescence. The Court thus relied primarily on
the separation of foreign relations authority among the federal
146
branches to uphold California’s foreign affairs–related action.
As these cases illustrate, one of the key features of the onevoice doctrine is that it applies along many dimensions. Part IX
will address why this feature is problematic, but first to the
doctrine’s other critical features.
V. THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S DIFFERENT THEORIES
In addition to addressing questions concerning the allocation of constitutional power along multiple dimensions, the onevoice doctrine reflects different theoretical approaches to these
questions. The first approach relies on sources such as constitutional text, structure, and history to discern the allocation of
foreign relations authority. Under this approach, the one-voice
tions is textually delegated to Congress alone”). Halberstam argues that Japan Line and Barclays Bank cohere when viewed as examples of the Court’s
zealousness “to preserve positive federal policy,” including policy derived from
scant evidence. Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1063–66. The difference in outcomes results from state law conflict with such a policy in Japan Line and
consistency with such a policy in Barclays Bank. Id.
145. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330 (“The Constitution does ‘not make the
judiciary the overseer of our government.’” (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981))); see also id. at 334 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress, not the Executive or the
Judiciary, has been given the power to regulate commerce.”); cf. Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 194 (noting, among other things, the judiciary’s limited
“competence [to] determin[e] precisely when foreign nations will be offended
by particular acts” in deciding whether state action “violate[s] the ‘one voice’
standard”).
146. Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence and dissent took a similar approach, noting Congress’s, rather than the executive’s or judiciary’s, preeminence in foreign commerce and rejecting reliance on “statements made and
briefs filed by officials in the Executive Branch” in assessing preemption when
Congress is silent. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 334 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Chy Lung also takes somewhat
of the hybrid approach. The Court in that case rejected a California statute in
light of the national government’s—but specifically Congress’s—foreign commerce power. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
A variation of this hybrid approach appears in Sabbatino. There the Court
concluded that whether state courts may decide the validity of acts of foreign
sovereigns within their own territory turns on whether it is appropriate as a
matter of separation of powers for federal courts to do so. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–28 (1964); see also Harold G. Maier,
Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 832, 835
(1989) (noting that Sabbatino grounded the act of state doctrine’s preemptive
effect in “federal separation of powers principles”).
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doctrine generally appears as a conclusion. Based on text,
structure, and history, one branch of government is identified
as the authoritative voice. Barclays Bank illustrates this approach in simple form. Based on the Constitution’s textual assignment of the foreign commerce power to Congress, the Court
concluded that Congress is “the Nation’s” voice “in [the foreign
148
commerce] area,” and upheld, notwithstanding executive opposition, a state statute that Congress appeared “willing[] to
149
tolerate.”
The other approach to constitutional interpretation reflect150
ed in the one-voice doctrine is functional. Under this ap147. But cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 & n.25 (concluding that the act of
state doctrine is a matter of federal, not state, law based in part on “constitutional and statutory provisions . . . reflecting a concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations”).
148. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331.
149. Id. at 327; see id. 321–22, 324–30 & nn.22–23, 30. But cf. supra note
46.
150. The two theories mix in the federalist context when functional reasons
that motivated the Framers (for example, the need to prevent a single state
from triggering retaliation against the United States) are cited in order to ascertain the structure reflected in the text actually adopted. Justice Souter relies on this hybrid in Garamendi when he says:
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National
Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the Constitution’s
allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government
in the first place.
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 427 n.25); see Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 282–83,
285–86, 293–94 (1976) (reasoning that the one-voice rationale motivated the
Import-Export Clause such that state taxes that do not interfere with the federal government’s ability to regulate foreign commerce “with one voice” are
not, absent other defects, subject to the Clause’s prohibition); see also Dep’t of
Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752–54 (1978) (relying on Michelin for the same); id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing
the Michelin approach as “a functional analysis based on [a state] exaction’s
relationship to the . . . policies that underlie the [Import-Export] Clause”); infra note 416. This mix arguably also appears in Japan Line, where the Court
indicated that the Foreign Commerce Clause was animated in part by the
need for uniformity in regulating commerce with foreign states. See Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448–50 & n.14 (1979).
Where the Court concludes that the Constitution as adopted mandates a functional analysis, the line between the two principal theories also blurs.
In a similar vein, a court might invoke functional reasons that motivated
the Framers without knowing or relying on that fact, in which case the court’s
theory would be functional notwithstanding the coincidence of reasoning between the two approaches. Zschernig likely fits within this category. See
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding an Oregon law unconsti-
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proach, the doctrine may appear not only as a conclusion but
also as a justification. It is in its functional form that Mike
Ramsey describes the doctrine when he says that “[t]he ‘one
voice’ invocation is . . . ultimately a policy prescription” that is
deemed so “overriding . . . given the acute danger of missteps in
foreign affairs, that it gains constitutional dimensions” even
151
though it is inconsistent with constitutional text.
Justice
Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Curtiss-Wright is perhaps
the best example of the functional manifestation of the one152
voice doctrine. After concluding that federal foreign affairs
power derives from U.S. sovereignty rather than from the
153
states, Justice Sutherland identified various prudential reasons why the President is the sole federal organ in foreign af154
fairs. Among these was the need for “unity of design” in in155
teracting with foreign states. National need to speak with one
156
voice led to the conclusion that the President is that voice.
The functional version of the doctrine is the most common
157
158
version and appears in recent opinions. For example, Justutional as applied, citing the danger U.S. states may produce if they may
adopt their “own foreign policy”); see also infra note 171 and accompanying
text.
151. RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 8; see also Ramsey, Original Understanding,
supra note 117, at 370–79 (arguing that the case for dormant foreign affairs
preemption is ultimately based on policy not compelled by constitutional structure).
152. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22
(1936).
153. See id. at 315–19.
154. See id. at 319–22. In Pink, the Court similarly relied on functionalism
in identifying the scope of the President’s authority as the one voice in foreign
affairs. “Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations[,
the Court reasoned,] requires no less” than the “modest implied [presidential]
power” to settle claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments in the
course of recognizing those governments. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
229 (1942).
155. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–
1901, at 24 (1901)).
156. See id. at 319–20.
157. See Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 367–69 (noting that the principal rationale for dormant preemption of state action bearing
on foreign affairs is functional).
158. In addition to the opinions discussed in text, see South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that state regulations burdening foreign, rather than merely interstate, commerce are more readily subject to dormant preemption because
“[i]t is crucial to the efficient execution of the Nation’s foreign policy that ‘the
Federal Government . . . speak with one voice when regulating commercial re-
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tice Breyer’s dissent in Zivotofsky concluded that the case presented a political question as a result of “[f]our sets of prudential considerations,” including the fact that “the issue before
159
[the Court arose] in the field of foreign affairs.” “The Constitution[, he reasoned,] primarily delegates the foreign affairs
powers ‘to the political departments of the government, . . .’ not
160
to the Judiciary.” While he may have been relying on the
Constitution’s text or the founding generation’s motivations for
adopting that text in making this statement, he did not turn to
161
either of those sources explicitly. Instead, he noted that the
Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority is unsurprising in light of a variety of functional considerations. Among
these was the presumption that “where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak ‘with one
162
voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly important.” Functional
considerations, including the one-voice rationale, informed Justice Breyer’s sense of the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs.
Functional considerations likewise informed the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Munaf v. Geren that the judiciary should
not second-guess the executive’s assessment of the likelihood of
torture if American citizens held by the United States in Iraq
163
were transferred to Iraqi keeping. Judicial involvement was
improper because it “would require . . . pass[ing] judgment on
foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s abil164
ity to speak with one voice.” Unlike the judiciary, “the political branches [were] well situated to consider [and adopt policies
165
regarding] sensitive foreign policy issues,” at least in part be-

lations with foreign governments’” (alteration in original) (quoting Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978) (finding no dormant preemption of state law where
there was no need for “a uniform national rule” on the matter); and id. at 186
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding no dormant
preemption of state law where variable local conditions made local regulation
“appropriate, and perhaps even necessary”).
159. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1437 (2012)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948)).
161. See id. at 1437–38.
162. Id. at 1438 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
163. See 553 U.S. 674, 702–03 (2008).
164. Id. at 702.
165. Id.
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cause they “possess significant diplomatic tools and leverage
166
the judiciary lacks.”
The choice between the functional and what might be
termed the structural approach to the constitutional allocation
of foreign affairs authority is significant. On the one hand, a
structural approach might handicap efforts of the President or
states to respond to foreign affairs problems. On the other
hand, a functional approach might lead to excessive executive
authority in foreign relations. The Court in Dames & Moore v.
Regan suggested as much when it noted “the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive authority
in a world that presents each day some new challenge with
which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all
live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of
167
checks and balances.”
Perhaps as a result of the pros and cons of each approach,
some cases emphasize one theory, while shades of both theories
appear in others. The opinion in Zschernig presents a subtle
168
example. In Zschernig, the Court started from the assumption, presumably grounded at least in part in constitutional
text, that “the Constitution entrusts [the field of foreign affairs]
169
to the President and the Congress.” Yet, among other things,
the Court cited functional considerations in determining

166. Id. at 703 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 20 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Brown, J., dissenting)).
167. 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981).
168. For another example, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). In
that case, the Court cited both the textual commitment of foreign commerce
authority to Congress and the need to prevent one state from “embroil[ing the
United States] in disastrous quarrels with other nations” in concluding that
Congress, not the states, possesses the authority to regulate immigration. Id.
at 279–80. Similarly, in United States v. Pink, the Court relied on the President’s power to recognize other governments, “the historic conception of the
powers and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs,”
and the functional need for the President to have certain powers to effectively
“handl[e] the delicate problems of foreign relations” in upholding the President’s settlement of claims against the Soviet Union in conjunction with
recognition of the new Soviet government. 315 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1942). In
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court relied primarily on functional
considerations but also on “constitutional and statutory provisions . . . reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations and
indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions,” 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964), in concluding that
the act of state doctrine is a matter of federal law, id. at 423–27 & n.25.
169. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
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whether Oregon had intruded into that federal trust. The
Court looked at the state law’s “potential for disruption or em171
barrassment” in foreign affairs. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Garamendi followed the same pattern. Justice Ginsburg began
describing the executive as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts
172
properly defer in matters of foreign affairs,”
a conclusion
about the President’s foreign affairs authority apparently
173
grounded in constitutional history and precedent; she then
argued, however, that “[s]ustaining [the state law at issue]
would not compromise the President’s ability to speak with one
174
voice for the Nation,” arguably a functional reason for upholding the law.
VI. THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S INCONSISTENCY WITH
THE CONSTITUTION
Even if the one-voice doctrine solely reflected a structural
approach to constitutional questions, the doctrine would be
flawed. Whether in its federalist or separation of powers dimensions, the doctrine is only partially supported by the Con175
stitution.
A. FEDERALIST DIMENSION
The one-voice doctrine derives greatest support from constitutional text, structure, and history in its federalist dimen176
sion. The Constitution’s text grants the federal government
foreign affairs powers, such as the authority to make treaties
170. The Court considered more formal arguments as well, categorizing
policymaking as within the federal foreign affairs domain and concluding that
the states were making policy. See id. at 435–39 & n.8.
171. Id. at 435; see also id. at 441 (noting how “a State’s policy may disturb
foreign relations” and “the dangers which are involved if each State . . . is
permitted to establish its own foreign policy”).
172. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 430 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
173. See id. at 436–38 (citing id. at 415 (majority opinion)).
174. Id. at 442.
175. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 8 (“Whatever one thinks of the ‘one
voice’ idea as a policy matter, it is fundamentally opposed to the constitutional
design. The Constitution’s text divides foreign affairs power among multiple
independent power centers[, a]nd . . . it is plain that this did not occur by accident. The Constitution deliberately fosters multiple voices in foreign affairs . . . .”).
176. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 979–80 (“The principle that authority
over foreign relations vests exclusively in the national government, to the exclusion of the states, has strong constitutional roots . . . .”); id. at 990–91.
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177

and to regulate foreign commerce,
while prohibiting the
states from foreign affairs activities such as treaty and alliance
178
making.
These provisions are consistent with a broader
structure in which federal lawmaking is supreme and the
states retain “powers not delegated to the United States by the
179
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.” Both text
and structure reflect a pre-constitutional history in which federal inability to regulate foreign commerce and to enforce treaties and customary international law led to efforts to provide
180
the national government supremacy over foreign affairs.
At the same time, the Constitution does not exclude the
181
states from having some voice in foreign affairs. In the highly
unlikely event that a state is “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,” a state may go to
182
war without Congress’s approval. More relevant, with Congress’s permission, states may “lay . . . Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports,” impose “Dut[ies] of Tonnage, keep Troops,
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into . . . Agreement[s] or
183
Compact[s] . . . with a foreign Power, [and] engage in War.”
Since 1955, forty-one states have entered over 340 agreements,
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178. Id. art. I, § 10.
179. Id. amend. X; see id. art. VI, cl. 2; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 990.
180. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 36–46; Cleveland, supra note 1, at
990 & n.112. This does not mean that constitutional history lacks any support
for state involvement in foreign affairs. The fact that the Articles of Confederation prohibited states from sending ambassadors but the Constitution does
not might support the conclusion that states have some room to send representatives to other countries (for example, on trade missions). See Goldsmith,
supra note 12, at 1707. The general history of the Constitution, however, is
one of strengthening federal over state foreign affairs authority.
181. See David H. Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking,
59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 623 (2011) [hereinafter Moore, Unconstitutional
Treatymaking]; see also CORWIN, supra note 81, at 203–04 (“[S]ection 10 of Article I quite clearly recognizes the states as retaining a certain rudimentary
capacity in [foreign affairs] . . . .”); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 1012 (briefly asserting that “the Framers’ primary concern [was] ensuring that the national
government had authority to prevent states from interfering in the foreign affairs area” rather than that the states never engage in behavior affecting foreign affairs, even behavior tolerated by the national government).
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. A state may also, without congressional
approval, “lay . . . Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . [as] absolutely
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws” but “the net Produce of all Duties
and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.” Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
183. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3.
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both binding and not, with other countries and their subdivisions; over two hundred of these have been concluded in rough184
ly the last decade. Yet “Congress has reviewed fewer than a
dozen [such agreements] in the last century, consenting to just
185
six and rejecting only one outright.” Many of these agreements are mundane, addressing issues such as transboundary
186
highways, bridges, and firefighting. Yet some are more sub187
stantive and controversial. In 2003, for example, Kansas apparently entered, without congressional authorization, a nonbinding agreement with Cuba under which “Cuba . . . committed to buy $10 million in Kansas agricultural products” and
Kansas agreed to “encourage the repeal of federal trade and
188
travel sanctions against Cuba.” In short, states are engaged
189
in making international agreements on a significant scale.
Further, even if the Constitution universally required congres190
sional approval of even non-binding agreements, states would
still play a role in initiating these agreements before, and carry
them out after, congressional approval. Implementation of an
agreement or compact with another nation undoubtedly involves discretion and policy choices that may affect foreign affairs. As a result, even state action that requires federal approval may result in more than de minimus involvement in
foreign affairs.
184. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV.
741, 744 (2010) [hereinafter Hollis, Compact Clause]; see also id. at 749–54,
759, 769, 790–93. Moreover, “these numbers certainly undercount the actual
practice, since no formal mechanisms exist for collecting or monitoring” these
agreements. Id. at 744.
185. Id. at 742; see also id. at 742 n.12.
186. See id. at 742 & nn.10–12, 750, 754–55.
187. See id. at 741–42 & n.3, 754–59, 787–88.
188. Id. at 741; see also id. at 741–42 & n.3, 759, 788.
189. Cf. Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign
Policies, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1992, at 158, 158 (“The explosive growth of
municipal foreign policy in the past decade has been impressive . . . .”).
190. In the interstate compact context, the Supreme Court has recognized a
“category of interstate agreements that states can make free from any congressional oversight or approval.” Hollis, Compact Clause, supra note 184, at
759–60; see also id. at 743, 759–66, 769–70. Moreover, it is widely believed
that the Court’s interstate compact jurisprudence applies to compacts with
foreign states. See id. at 743, 759–60, 766–69, 805. But see id. at 743 n.17,
744–46, 769–801, 805–06 (noting limited opposition to, and arguing against,
this position). Thus, there may be agreements that states may enter with foreign states that do not trigger the need for congressional approval. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 994 (“[S]tate and local governments have entered
agreements without congressional consent on local matters such as police cooperation, border control and road construction.”).
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Further, as a structural matter, the Constitution “reserve[s] to the States . . . or to the people” powers not delegated
191
to the federal government. While the conventional wisdom is
that the states did not retain exclusive foreign affairs powers,
the Constitution might be understood as delegating, or prohib192
iting to the states, only certain foreign affairs powers. Moreover, even if the federal foreign affairs power is comprehensive,
193
it may not be exclusive. For example, even if Article III could
be read as extending federal judicial power to all justiciable
foreign affairs controversies, Article III does not make the fed194
eral power exclusive. Indeed, it does not create any lower fed195
eral courts that might exercise the federal judicial power. The
Constitution thus leaves open the possibility that cases bearing
on foreign affairs will be heard not only by federal courts, but

191. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This argument, of course, disregards Justice
Sutherland’s discredited theory that the federal government’s foreign affairs
authority, unlike its domestic authority, derived from Britain upon independence and not from the states. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–18 (1936) (developing Justice Sutherland’s theory of
extraconstitutional federal foreign affairs authority); RAMSEY, supra note 7, at
13–48 (summarizing and discrediting Justice Sutherland’s theory); Michael D.
Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 379, 379–82, 386–437 (2000) (same).
192. Cf., e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2000) (summarizing the argument that
the treaty power should be understood to “allow the treatymakers the ability
to conclude treaties on any subject but . . . limit their ability to create supreme
federal law to the scope of Congress’s power to do so”). The possibility that the
states retained some foreign affairs–related leeway grows if the vesting of executive power in the President does not include otherwise unenumerated foreign affairs powers. See Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at
348, 396–432 (noting, but ultimately rejecting, the argument that the Vesting
Clause “gives the President a general foreign policy power” that supports
preemption of state action affecting presidential foreign policy).
193. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1618–25, 1641–98 (arguing that
while federal foreign affairs authority is plenary, the federal political branches
generally must act to preempt state action bearing on foreign affairs); Ramsey,
Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 347–48, 370, 379–90, 403–32 (arguing that while the Constitution sought “to strengthen the national government’s foreign affairs powers,” statements by the Framers combined with constitutional text and pre- and post-ratification history support the conclusion
that state foreign affairs activity is only limited by “the express or implied
[constitutional] limitations directed at particular subjects such as war and
treatymaking and the general preemptive power of [adopted] federal statutes
and treaties under” the Supremacy Clause).
194. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
195. Id.
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by the state courts. In short, notwithstanding the historical
goal to invest the federal government with foreign affairs power, under the text adopted there is some room for state involvement in foreign affairs.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS
The Constitution is more enigmatic when it comes to the
horizontal distribution of foreign affairs authority and, in par197
ticular, to the scope of the President’s foreign affairs power.
This uncertainty arises, in large part, from the Vesting Clause,
which states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
198
President of the United States of America.” James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton debated the significance of this clause,
with Hamilton arguing that it gave the President broad power
subject only to express constitutional limitations that were to
199
be strictly construed.
Under this view, for example, Congress’s power to declare war, with its attendant authority to decide whether any treaties of alliance obligate the United States
to declare war, would not displace the President’s “similar right
of Judgment” with regard to the same treaties under his “du196. See Young, supra note 9, at 425–32, 449 n.423 (describing in greater
detail the role the Constitution leaves to state courts). But cf. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1636 (describing cases in which federal courts have found federal question jurisdiction over state law claims that implicate foreign affairs).
197. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (noting, in assessing the scope of presidential foreign affairs power, “that ‘[t]he great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white’” (alteration in original) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), as quoting Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)));
CORWIN, supra note 81, at 201 (describing the Constitution as “an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy”). But cf.
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 356 (“propound[ing] a
. . . textual theory that finds in the Constitution a complete division and allocation of foreign affairs authority”).
198. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
199. Hamilton, supra note 74, at 39, 42; see also James Madison,
“Helvidius” Number 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
66, 67, 80 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter Madison,
“Helvidius” Number 1] (summarizing Hamilton’s argument in the course of
responding to it). The Supreme Court leaned toward Hamilton’s position when
it stated in Garamendi that “[a]lthough the source of the President’s power to
act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on
the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized
the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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200

ty . . . to preserve Peace till war is declared.” Madison took a
narrower view of the Vesting Clause, contending that the executive power is not as broad as Hamilton suggested. In particular, he argued that the powers to declare war and to make treaties are not executive in nature, such that constitutional
exceptions to the vesting of these powers in the President
201
should be construed against, not in favor of, the President.
Madison likewise rejected the notion that the President retains
concurrent authority to do what has been assigned to Congress
202
(or the judiciary). Debates over the proper interpretation of
the Vesting Clause and the resulting scope of presidential pow203
er continue to this day.
Whatever the ultimate scope of presidential power over
foreign affairs, there is no plausible argument that executive
204
power is exclusive. As I and others have noted, “[t]he Consti200. Hamilton, supra note 74, at 40.
201. See Madison, “Helvidius” Number 1, supra note 199, at 67–73; James
Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2 (Aug. 31, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 199, at 80, 80–82 [hereinafter Madison, “Helvidius”
Number 2].
202. See Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2, supra note 201, at 81–87; id. at
83 (“A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the
same function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.”).
203. Compare, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at
234, 252–54, 256–58 (arguing that the Vesting Clause provides the President
“a ‘residual’ foreign affairs power”), and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1591 (2005) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, Defense] (same), with
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2004) (discounting “the Vesting Clause Thesis” on textual and historical grounds).
204. See Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 238 (noting
that even a constitutional theory of presidential primacy “is fatally incomplete,” since “it lacks a textual basis”). Indeed, Prakash and Ramsey have argued that it is hard to find constitutional support even for presidential status
as “sole organ of communication,” id. at 244, without relying on the Vesting
Clause, id. at 243–44 & n.47, 251, 258 & n.108, 262, 323–24; see also Prakash
& Ramsey, Defense, supra note 203, at 1674 (same); Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331, 357–64 (2013) (discussing the diplomatic powers the President possesses under the executive’s discrete enumerated powers and under the Vesting Clause, noting that it is harder to derive
broad diplomatic authority from the President’s discrete powers than from the
Vesting Clause); cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 206–15 (2009) [hereinafter
Hathaway, Presidential Power]; id. at 210 (“[T]he President has a unilateral
. . . power to communicate with foreign nations. . . . [But] there are limits on
the President’s power to communicate and hence to make international legal
commitments . . . .”).
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tution distributes foreign relations authority among all three
205
branches of the federal government.” Thus, even if Hamilton
is correct that the President’s executive power properly includes concurrent, though ultimately subordinate, power over
matters assigned to Congress, the fact remains that Congress
possesses certain foreign affairs powers. Indeed, Congress re206
ceives the lion’s share of enumerated foreign affairs powers.
207
Congress may regulate foreign commerce and U.S. territo208
209
ries; impose “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”; borrow
210
money and pay debt; “regulate the Value” of U.S. and foreign
211
212
money; create naturalization rules; admit new states (for
213
example, Puerto Rico); oversee certain foreign relations initi214
atives of U.S. states; “define and punish” violations of international law as well as “Piracies and Felonies committed on the
215
high Seas”; create and vest in federal courts jurisdiction over
216
certain foreign relations cases; “declare War, grant Letters of

205. Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 616; see also, e.g., Bestor, supra note 7, at 34 (“Far from placing matters connected with
foreign affairs exclusively in executive hands, the Constitution carefully parcels them out among the three branches. This fact is obvious on the very face
of the document.”); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984–85, 989 (“[I]t is clear that
the Framers guaranteed, as a matter of constitutional design, that the United
States would not ‘speak with one voice’ in foreign relations. The foreign affairs
powers are carefully divided among the three branches of the national government.”); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1689 (“The Constitution does not
purport to limit activity that affects foreign affairs to a single person or
voice . . . .”). For an extensive, though nonexhaustive, chart of the distribution
of foreign affairs authority among the three branches of the federal government, see Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 617–19.
206. See Adler, supra note 68, at 19–20, 47; Cleveland, supra note 1, at
984; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 619. But see
CORWIN, supra note 81, at 201 (“The verdict of history . . . is that the power to
determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided
power, with the lion’s share falling usually, though by no means always, to the
President.”).
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
209. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (requiring that “[a]ll
Bills for raising Revenue . . . originate in the House of Representatives”).
210. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1–2.
211. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
212. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
213. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
214. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
215. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
216. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3526 (3d ed.
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Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
217
218
Land and Water”; “provide for the common Defence,” including by raising, supporting, and regulating an Army and
Navy as well as regulating in certain ways and “calling forth
219
220
the Militia”; appropriate funds; and enact laws “necessary
and proper” to carry out both its own, and other branches’,
221
powers. The President, by contrast, is “Commander in Chief”
and exercises authority over executive agencies like the State
222
and Commerce Departments. The President may enter treaties and appoint ambassadors and consuls with Senate approv223
al; may “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; . . .
224
[and must] take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
The federal judiciary’s constitutional authority extends, among
other things, to “Cases . . . arising under . . . Treaties”; “Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”; and “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
225
States, Citizens or Subjects.” The Supreme Court possesses
original jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
226
other public Ministers and Consuls.” As a result of its jurisdictional reach, the judiciary “may disrupt U.S. foreign relations policies in a variety of ways,” including by “refus[ing federal] extradition requests” and hearing “politically sensitive
227
suits . . . against foreign states.”
Not only does foreign affairs authority thus reach beyond
the presidency to the other two branches (and particularly the
legislative branch), but the President’s specific foreign affairs
2008) (discussing the “orthodox view [that] Congress is free to grant or withhold” federal subject matter jurisdiction).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
218. Id. pmbl.
219. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (authorizing Congress to purchase with state consent, and enact laws for, property “for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings”).
220. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
221. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Moreover, Congress can, through legislation,
trump a prior treaty as a matter of domestic law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a)
(1987).
222. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
223. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
224. Id. art. II, § 3.
225. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. But cf. id. amend. XI (restricting federal judicial
power to hear lawsuits by foreign nationals against U.S. states).
226. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
227. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 988–89.
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228

powers are all, in some sense, joint. While the President is
Commander in Chief and receives ambassadors, “no less than
six of the eighteen clauses in the eighth section of article I are
grants to Congress of various specific powers crucial to the
making of war” and “[t]he power to appoint ambassadors”—the
other, and more important, leg of the power to conduct foreign
relations—“is a power that the President is required to exercise
229
in conjunction with the Senate.” Similarly, the President may
enter Article II treaties only “with the Advice and [supermajor230
ity] Consent of the Senate.” The Constitution thus makes
clear that federal foreign affairs authority reaches beyond the
President.
VII. THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S DIVERGENCE FROM
PRACTICE
The one-voice doctrine’s departure from constitutional text,
structure, and history might be tolerable if it reflected how the
231
Constitution has been understood in practice. However, neither the President nor Congress, the Supreme Court nor the
232
states has consistently followed the doctrine in practice. The
historical description of the doctrine above noted ways in which
these actors have endorsed the doctrine; this Part exposes ways
in which these actors’ practices diverge from the doctrine.
228. See, e.g., Bestor, supra note 7, at 33–34 (noting that of the four specific
foreign relations powers given to the President, two are shared and two are
half powers that “depend for [their] effectiveness upon the exercise of a complementary power specifically vested elsewhere”).
229. Bestor, supra note 7, at 34.
230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Bestor, supra note 7, at 33. These days, the United States enters most international agreements through the
congressional-executive, rather than Article II, process. See, e.g., Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 606 & n.38 (citing Oona A.
Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1254 n.45, 1258–60 &
n.53 (2008) [hereinafter Hathaway, Treaties’ End]). Similar to Article II treaties, these agreements require approval from a majority in both houses of
Congress. See Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra, at 1255.
231. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008) (noting that
“[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power”; nevertheless “if pervasive
enough, a history of congressional acquiescence can be treated as a gloss on
‘Executive Power’ vested in the President” (alteration in original) (quoting
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)) (some internal quotation
marks omitted)).
232. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1688 (“Foreign relations law is replete with struggles between the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the President, and sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations
voice.”).
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A. PRACTICE OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
As Edward Corwin famously put it, the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers among the federal branches “is
an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American
233
foreign policy.” The political branches frequently accept that
234
invitation. The President and Congress often speak with dif235
fering voices in matters of foreign affairs. The President negotiates and signs treaties only to have them languish in the
236
Senate, sometimes for decades. Some of the modern era’s
most prominent treaties, such as the International Covenant on
237
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Kyoto Proto238
col, have been signed by the executive but remain unrati239
fied. Presidential nominations of ambassadors have met with
foreign policy–based resistance in the Senate. In recent years,
members of the Senate opposed the nomination of John Bolton
233. CORWIN, supra note 81, at 201; see also id. at 255.
234. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1688–89 (“The federal government . . . rarely speaks with one voice in foreign relations.”).
235. See, e.g., id. at 1688–89 n.287 (noting foreign policy disagreements between federal actors as well as within the executive); Nzelibe, supra note 9, at
965 (providing examples of how “Congress and the President routinely joust
for power in foreign affairs matters”); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at
34 (noting disagreements between the President and Congress on human
rights policy); id. at 35 (“[I]t seems unrealistic and ahistorical, even vaguely
romantic, to maintain the ‘one-voice’ ideal in the face of the near-constant
struggle between Congress and the President on foreign policy.”). Moreover,
regardless whether Congress disagrees with the President on any particular
issue, it is clear that Congress actively participates in international relations.
As Ryan Scoville has recently documented, members of Congress frequently
travel (including under a permanent appropriation) to other countries to meet
with a wide range of foreign officials and to address a wide range of issues. See
Scoville, supra note 204, at 339–50, 355–56. Members of Congress likewise
meet with, and are lobbied by, representatives of other nations at home. Id. at
350–51, 355.
236. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 985–87; Levinson, supra note 9, at
2195–96; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 600, 608–
09, 660–61. Once ratified, treaties may be preempted as a matter of domestic
law by a later in time statute. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 & cmt. a (1987); Ramsey,
Non-preemptive, supra note 9, at 562.
237. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed by United States Oct. 5, 1977), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20933/v933.pdf.
238. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (signed by United States Nov.
12, 1998), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%
202303/v2303.pdf.
239. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 600.
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as Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations in light of
240
Bolton’s previously expressed antipathy to the U.N. Legislative and executive disagreement on the distribution of war
241
powers has been ongoing. The President and Congress have
likewise repeatedly disagreed on specific issues, such as the
242
proper U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem. In the 2011
Term, the Supreme Court faced (and remanded) a claim arising
from the executive’s refusal to implement “a statute providing
that Americans born in Jerusalem may elect to have ‘Israel’
243
listed as the place of birth on their passports.” Moreover, not
only do Congress and the President disagree, but successive
Congresses and administrations, and actors within Congress or
244
the executive may disagree.
For example, the House and
Senate or the Department of Defense and the Department of
State may disagree on the correct foreign policy. Even the President at times has been reluctant to fully embrace the one-voice
role, preferring for strategic or political reasons to involve Con245
gress in foreign policy decisions and treaty negotiations.
240. See, e.g., Julian Borger, Democrats Try to Block Bush’s Man for UN
Job, GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/
12/usa.unitednations; Elisabeth Bumiller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President
Sends Bolton to U.N.; Bypasses Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www
.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/politics/02bolton.html.
241. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 988.
242. See, e.g., Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45,
§§ 3(a)(3)–(b), 7, 109 Stat. 398, 399–400 (1995) (declaring U.S. policy that “the
United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem” and prohibiting the State Department from using certain funds “until the Secretary of
State . . . reports to Congress that the United States Embassy in Jerusalem
has officially opened” absent presidential waiver for national security reasons); id. § 2(13)–(14), 109 Stat. at 399 (describing past congressional support
for “relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem”); Cleveland, supra
note 1, at 987 (noting successive presidents’ refusal “to honor Congress’ [sic]
effort to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem”).
243. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424, 1431
(2012).
244. See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences
Foreign and Defense Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17, 18 (Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds.,
1993); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 34. Steinhardt adds that Supreme Court separation of powers case law has undermined the notion “of a
coherent and self-contained executive branch.” Id. at 35–36.
245. See, e.g., BERDAHL, supra note 80, at 33–34 (discussing President
Jackson’s hesitance to recognize Texas’s independence without support from
Congress); James M. Lindsay, Congress and Diplomacy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL, supra note 244, at
261, 266–68, 271–73 (discussing situations in which the President has consulted with, or included in treaty negotiations, members of Congress); Peter
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B. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
1. Separation of Powers
Supreme Court practice has also diverged from the onevoice doctrine. Even as it continues to employ the doctrine, the
Court recognizes the shared nature of federal foreign affairs
246
power. In Zschernig the Court struck a state statute as “an
Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/
middleeast/syria.html (noting President Obama’s decision to seek congressional support for missile strikes on Syria).
246. For additional opinions recognizing that federal foreign affairs authority is shared, see, for example, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1441 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Executive and Legislative Branches frequently work out disagreements through ongoing contacts and relationships . . . [which] ensure that,
in practice, Members of Congress as well as the President play an important
role in the shaping of foreign policy.”); American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414, 424 n.14, 427 (2003) (emphasizing the President’s
independent foreign affairs power, while also recognizing, among other things,
that “Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings
with other nations in its war and foreign commerce powers”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) (recognizing “Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters” while asserting a role for judicial review of executive alien
detention decisions); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
374–76, 381 (2000) (invoking Justice Jackson’s framework and recognizing the
strength of the President’s authority in light of a statute delegating authority
to the President); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298,
327 (1994) (noting that the nuances of U.S. foreign policy “are much more the
province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of [the Supreme] Court”
(quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983)));
Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional power over foreign affairs is
shared by Congress and the President . . . .”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 662, 668–88 (1981) (noting “the never-ending tension between the
President exercising the executive authority . . . and the Constitution . . .
which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances,”
and ultimately upholding the constitutionality of presidential acts pursuant to
an executive agreement in light of congressional support for the acts); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004–05 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy decisions that bear on treaty matters. . . . [and] thus retains a
strong influence over the President’s conduct in treaty matters.” (quoting
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., concurring in the result))); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423,
427–28 (1964) (noting that “[t]he act of state doctrine [has] ‘constitutional’ underpinnings” and that the doctrine’s “continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs”); id.
at 461–62 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that while “political matters in the
realm of foreign affairs are within the exclusive domain of the Executive
Branch . . . . this is far from saying that the Constitution vests in the executive
exclusive absolute control of foreign affairs” to the exclusion of the judiciary);
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intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
247
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”
More systematically, in evaluating the constitutionality of “executive action in [foreign affairs],” the Court applies “the accepted framework” provided by “Justice Jackson’s familiar tri248
partite scheme.” That scheme, which originated in Justice
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw249
yer, builds on the principle that “[p]residential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or con250
junction with those of Congress.” “When the President acts”
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 109, 111 (1948) (describing the President “as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs” while recognizing that Congress possesses “power over foreign
commerce” and that foreign policy “decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–74 (1941) (recognizing that “regulation of aliens” is an issue of foreign relations that both Congress and
federal treatymakers can address); and Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of [foreign affairs] is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government . . . .”).
247. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 436 (“[T]he Constitution entrusts [foreign affairs and international
relations] solely to the Federal Government . . . .”); id. at 438 (noting that foreign policy positions and conditions “are matters for the Federal Government,
not for local probate courts”).
248. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008); see also Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 661 (describing Justice Jackson’s concurrence as “bring[ing] together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this
area”).
249. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 635. The other opinions in Youngstown likewise emphasized
Congress’s power in deciding the constitutionality of the President’s actions.
See id. at 585–89 (majority opinion) (asserting that “[t]he President’s power [to
seize domestic steel mills threatened with closure by a labor dispute] must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,” and concluding that Congress had rejected a presidential seizure power and that the
Constitution assigned the legislative power to Congress); id. at 597–614
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (agreeing that the President’s seizure was unlawful where Congress had rejected rather than approved or acquiesced in a presidential seizure power); id. at 630–33 (Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding
that the President’s seizure was an exercise of legislative power entrusted to
Congress); id. at 655–60 (Burton, J., concurring) (explaining that “[t]he validity of the President’s [action] turns upon its relation to the constitutional division of governmental power between Congress and the President,” and concluding that the President acted unconstitutionally where “Congress, within
its constitutionally delegated power, . . . prescribed for the President specific
procedures . . . . [and] reserved to itself” whether to take the action the President unilaterally elected); id. at 662–66 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment)
(concluding that the President acted illegally in failing to follow the “specific
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with congressional approval, “his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses . . . plus all that Congress
251
can delegate.” When the President contravenes Congress’s
will, “his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
252
powers of Congress over the matter.” When Congress is silent, the President must “rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain” such that the President’s actions may or may not be
253
constitutional. This framework not only recognizes that foreign affairs authority is shared between the President and
Congress, but recognizes a role for the courts in deciding how
254
that authority is shared.
The framework is foundational in foreign affairs jurisprudence and has provided the controlling analysis in recent for255
eign affairs cases, including war on terror cases. In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, in which the Court assessed the President’s ability to
detain “a United States citizen on United States soil as an ‘en256
emy combatant,’” the plurality and Justice Thomas both upheld the detention after concluding that Congress, through the
procedures [Congress had dictated] to deal with the type of crisis” at issue); id.
at 672, 683, 700–04, 708–10 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the President acted constitutionally because the seizure served “to preserve legislative
programs [for military procurement and wage stabilization] from destruction
until Congress could act”).
The Court in Dames & Moore acknowledged the tension between Youngstown’s limitation of presidential power and Curtiss-Wright’s emphasis on presidential primacy. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661–62. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
251. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson suggests (a) that Curtiss-Wright’s perspective on presidential power was
so broad because the case involved a situation where the President acted pursuant to congressional authorization (and thereby “personif[ied] the federal
sovereignty”), and (b) that Curtiss-Wright is precedent only for such cases. See
id. at 635–36 & n.2, 638.
252. Id. at 637.
253. Id.
254. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 110–13 (2002) (discussing Youngstown’s import for judicial review of actions of the political branches).
255. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 621–22.
But cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s
Shadow, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 35–37 (2008) (arguing that the Court in
Medellín and Hamdan “invoked Justice Jackson’s framework, even while appearing to deviate from it”).
256. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 516.
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Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), had author257
ized the President to detain. Justice Souter, on the other
hand, found that the AUMF did not satisfy an earlier statute
that prohibited the detention of U.S. citizens in the absence of
258
congressional authorization. Notwithstanding their divergent
conclusions, the opinions consistently looked to both the President and Congress to assess the legality of the President’s detention of a U.S. citizen. The Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
likewise looked to congressional action to determine the constitutionality of a presidential plan to use military commissions to
259
try war-on-terror detainees. The Court rejected the plan because Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohib260
ited the President’s resort to military commissions. As Justice Breyer highlighted in his concurring opinion, “[t]he Court’s
conclusion ultimately rest[ed] upon a single ground: Congress
261
ha[d] not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”
Instead,
“Congress ha[d] denied the President the legislative authority
262
to create military commissions of the kind at issue.”
As this case law demonstrates, the President does not
stand alone in foreign affairs. Foreign affairs power is shared
with Congress. There is obvious tension, however, between the257. See id. at 509, 517–19; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). At the same
time, Justice Thomas disagreed with limitations the plurality placed on “the
President’s authority to detain enemy combatants.” Id. at 587–88.
258. Id. at 541–45, 547–51 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter expressly relied on the separation of powers between Congress and the executive in
reaching this conclusion. Id. at 545.
259. See 548 U.S. 557, 593 & n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in
proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))); id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank
check.’ Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.” (citation omitted)); id.
at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[This] is a case where Congress, in the
proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government . . . has
considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s
authority.”); see also id. at 613, 627–28 (majority opinion); id. at 642–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore,
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120
HARV. L. REV. 869, 931–32 (2007).
260. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567, 592–95, 613–33; see also id. at 636
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 636–53 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
262. Id.

1006

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:953

se cases and the cases invoking the one-voice doctrine in allocating authority between the political branches. Arguably, the
tension does not rise to the level of outright conflict because the
Court relies in part on the one-voice doctrine in cases that also
263
recognize a place for Congress in foreign affairs. For example,
despite what it has come to stand for, Curtiss-Wright itself recognized a foreign affairs role for Congress. Curtiss-Wright concerned the constitutionality of legislative delegation of discre264
tion to the President. The Court upheld the statute, noting
that it was “here dealing not alone with an authority vested in
the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the [independent,] very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
265
government in the field of international relations.” Justice
Sutherland, the author of Curtiss-Wright, in a later case similarly recited precedent holding “that the conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments” and held, more narrowly, that “the Executive had
authority to speak as the sole organ of that government” with

263. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Marshall’s “sole organ” language to support the President’s primacy in foreign
affairs, while also acknowledging that “Congress . . . has a substantial and essential role in . . . foreign affairs”); Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
414 (2003) (reciting language concerning the President’s role “as the Nation’s
organ in foreign affairs,” while recognizing Congress’s foreign commerce and
war powers (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 109 (1948))); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62, 668–
88 (1981) (quoting, without overruling, Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” language,
but also highlighting “[t]he tensions present in any exercise of executive power
under the [Constitution’s] tripartite system of Federal Government,” recognizing the paucity and inconsistency of precedents addressing executive power,
and both noting Youngstown’s preeminence among these precedents and applying its shared-powers framework); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–68 & n.2 (1972) (plurality opinion) (citing both the
President’s “sole organ” status and constitutional commitment of foreign affairs to the legislative and executive branches on the way to recognizing executive primacy in foreign relations).
264. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314–15,
319–20 (1936); see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (citing
Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that “[a]lthough there is in the Constitution
no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power
in the law-making organ of the Nation”), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253, 255–57, 263, 267–68 (1967) (rejecting the congressional power,
recognized in Perez, to strip someone of U.S. citizenship, without denying an
implied congressional power to regulate foreign affairs).
265. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20.
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respect to “what was done” in the particular case. Moreover,
the Court has recognized that Congress is the one voice in cer267
tain subject areas, including foreign commerce.
Nonetheless, the one-voice doctrine suggests, and has been
used to conclude, that the President possesses an exclusive role
268
in foreign affairs. One might attempt to harmonize the onevoice doctrine with the Court’s broader foreign relations jurisprudence by asserting that the one-voice doctrine only means
that the President is the sole communicator with foreign states.
269
However, the one-voice doctrine has not been so limited. The
conclusion that the President is the one voice has been used to
justify more than an exclusive authority to communicate. As
270
noted above, it has supported authority to set foreign policy.
As a result, it is hard to fully reconcile the doctrine with Supreme Court case law recognizing that both political branches
play a role in foreign affairs.
The doctrine is likewise hard to square with case law that
recognizes room for the judiciary in foreign affairs. The courts
employ a number of doctrines—some generic, some unique to
foreign relations law—to police judicial involvement in foreign
271
272
affairs. Among the generic doctrines are standing, ripeness,

266. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328, 330 (1937).
267. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310, 324,
329, 331 (1994); cf. Brief Amicus Curiae for Cochise County Sheriff Larry A.
Dever in Support of Petitioners at 21, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 506637, at *21 (arguing that Congress is
the nation’s voice regarding immigration). Congress is also often described as
“the sole organ for levying taxes.” Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974).
268. BERDAHL, supra note 80, at 25 (“[T]he power of intercourse, intercommunication, and negotiation . . . . belongs exclusively to the President.”).
269. Moreover, even if the one-voice doctrine simply meant that the President was the sole communicator, it would not square with practice in which
the states and congresspersons engage in missions to foreign countries. See
supra note 235; infra text accompanying note 320.
270. See supra Part I.
271. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–24 (1997) (rejecting legislative standing of congresspersons challenging the Line Item Veto Act because
their votes had not been completely nullified and they did not suffer a personal
or particularized injury).
272. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997–98 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (voting to dismiss on ripeness grounds the challenge of several
congresspersons to President Carter’s unilateral termination of a treaty, reasoning that for prudential reasons “a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken
action asserting its constitutional authority”).
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mootness, personal jurisdiction,
forum non conveniens,
276
277
Chevron deference, and political question. While in many
cases these doctrines serve to limit judicial involvement in foreign affairs matters, in other cases they do not. Thus, in its
seminal political question opinion, the Court explained that,
while there are issues the judiciary will not decide, “it is error
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
278
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” The Court listed a
variety of issues that fit within judicial cognizance, such as
whether a treaty preempts particular state laws and whether,
in the absence of executive clarity, a foreign war exists that
279
triggers statutes securing U.S. neutrality. The Court’s recent
opinion in Zivotofsky reaffirmed the judiciary’s role over certain
273. See, e.g., Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1431, 1435 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that a constitutional challenge to a regulation requiring “[e]mployees of the State Department, the United States Information
Agency[,] . . . and the Agency for International Development . . . to submit [for
prepublication review] all speaking, writing, and teaching material on matters
of,” among other things, foreign policy, was not moot where the regulation
“remain[ed] in force”).
274. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 115 (1987) (concluding that California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
Japanese defendant facing a claim by a Taiwanese corporation would be unreasonable, in part due to federal foreign policy concerns).
275. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238–40, 246–61
(1981) (dismissing a suit concerning a plane crash in Scotland in favor of a
Scottish forum on forum non conveniens grounds).
276. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1347–54 (11th Cir. 2000)
(applying Chevron deference to uphold the Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s interpretation of an asylum statute in the Elian Gonzalez case). In
this case, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that Chevron deference is particularly appropriate in cases involving foreign affairs. See id. at 1351, 1353. As a result, Chevron deference may take on a unique form in the foreign affairs context.
277. See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that the challenge of several congresspersons to President Carter’s termination of a treaty presented a political question).
278. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part) (“A court may not refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because a decision ‘may’ . . . affect ‘the conduct of this Nation’s foreign relations . . . .’”
(quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986))); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (noting that while the Constitution commits foreign affairs to the political branches, it does not prohibit the judiciary from hearing any case “which touches foreign relations,” and in particular “does not irrevocably remove from the
judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state” (quoting
Baker, 369 U.S. at 211)).
279. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212–13.

2014]

BEYOND ONE VOICE

1009

280

foreign affairs issues and may signal a retreat from the political question doctrine in foreign affairs. As discussed previously, the question presented was whether Congress could statutorily require the executive to list Israel on the passport of
someone born in Jerusalem notwithstanding the President’s
281
“power to recognize foreign sovereigns” and the State Department’s “longstanding policy of not taking a position on the
282
political status of Jerusalem.” The Court rejected the lower
283
courts’ dismissal of the case on political question grounds.
284
The judiciary could properly resolve the question. Just as the
Court found room for the judiciary in deciding the separation of
powers question in Zivotofsky, the Court has asserted a role in
policing state action even when the executive is unconcerned
285
about that action.
Other foreign affairs doctrines similarly calibrate, rather
286
than eliminate, the judiciary’s involvement in foreign affairs.
Under the act of state doctrine, U.S. courts “will generally refrain from . . . sitting in judgment on . . . acts of a governmental
character done by a foreign state within its own territory and
287
applicable there.” However, if there is clear international law
that governs the foreign state’s conduct or if the concerns motivating the doctrine are not implicated even though the doctrine
technically applies, courts will disregard the doctrine and inde280. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428.
281. Id. at 1426.
282. Id. at 1424.
283. Id. at 1424–27; see also id. at 1434–35 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part) (same); id. at 1436–37 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
284. See id. at 1425, 1427–30 (majority opinion); id. at 1434–35
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); id. at 1436–37 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Powell reached a similar conclusion in Goldwater v. Carter,
which involved a challenge by members of Congress to the President’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997,
999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). In his view, “the question
presented . . . concern[ed] only the constitutional division of power between
Congress and the President,” a question that could be resolved using “normal
principles of [constitutional] interpretation” and thus did not present a political question. Id. at 999; see also id. at 1001–02.
285. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1620–21 (noting, while opposing,
“[t]he orthodox view . . . that judge-made federal foreign relations law constitutes [the nation’s voice to the preemption of state law] until the federal political branches say otherwise”); supra text accompanying note 51.
286. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 23–26 (identifying judicial
actions that bear on foreign affairs).
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 443(1) (1987).
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pendently assess the legality of the foreign sovereign’s acts.
Similarly, courts exercise ultimate discretion to decide whether
to apply the act of state doctrine when the executive has repre289
sented that the doctrine need not apply. Under principles of
international comity, courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases involving the executive, legislative, or judicial
290
acts of foreign states. Pursuant to jurisdiction provided by the
Alien Tort Statute, federal courts hear limited claims based on
291
customary international law. Invoking the Charming Betsy
288. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990) (reiterating the Court’s prior suggestion “that the policies underlying the act of state doctrine should be considered in deciding whether, despite
the doctrine’s technical availability, it should nonetheless not be invoked”);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he greater
the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987) (indicating that the act of state doctrine does
not apply in the face of “a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles”); id. § 443, cmt. b (noting the argument “that the
doctrine was not intended to preclude review of an act of a foreign state challenged under principles of international law not in dispute,” but recognizing
that “no such case had been decided” prior to the Restatement); id. § 443, rep.
note 5 (discussing “the treaty exception to the act of state doctrine”). Four Justices of the Supreme Court have also advocated a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine. See id. § 443, rep. note 6 (citing Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
289. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
772–73 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result); id. at 773 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 776–78, 780–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the notion that the act of state doctrine would not apply if the executive indicated that it need not, and noting that the four dissenting and two
concurring Justices endorse that rejection); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443, rep. note 8 (1987).
290. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–99 &
n.24 (1993) (suggesting, without deciding, that a court might be able to abstain from exercising jurisdiction based on international comity, but indicating
that the circumstances in which that would be appropriate are narrow); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 101, cmt. e (1987) (“Comity, in the legal sense . . . . is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.” (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1895))).
291. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25, 732 (2004) (recognizing some federal court authority to hear claims based on customary international law norms that are as well defined and widely accepted as the norms
Congress contemplated in enacting the Alien Tort Statute); see also David H.
Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
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canon, courts work to interpret federal statutes to avoid infractions of international law unless Congress has manifested in292
tent to violate.
Similarly, in applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality, courts interpret federal statutes to
apply only domestically absent clear evidence of congressional
293
intent to the contrary. And under the range of deference given to the executive in the realm of foreign affairs, courts give
more or less weight to the executive’s position in foreign affairs
294
cases. The result is that while the courts recognize limits to
295
their participation in foreign affairs matters, those limits fall
well short of outright exclusion. Many doctrines recognize a
role for the judiciary in foreign relations.
The room left for the judiciary results in disagreements be296
tween the political branches and the courts. Even recently,
the Court has rejected foreign relations–related positions taken
by both the President and Congress. For example, in
Zivotofsky, the Court rejected the executive’s claim that a challenge to the executive’s refusal to follow a statute endorsing Je297
rusalem as the capital of Israel presented a political question.
In Medellín v. Texas, the Court concluded that the President
lacked unilateral authority to execute an otherwise non-self1, 38–39 (2006) [hereinafter Moore, Emerging Uniformity] (discussing the
same); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 24–25 (identifying ways in
which Alien Tort Statute litigation might harm U.S. foreign affairs and violate
the one-voice rationale).
292. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877
(2010) (noting that the Charming Betsy canon is “a presumption about a statute’s meaning, rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate”); Hartford, 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed [under the
Charming Betsy canon] not to have exceeded . . . customary international-law
limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”).
293. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78, 2881–83.
294. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 116–29 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing and illustrating the degree of
deference courts give the executive on varying foreign relations matters);
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1192–93 & n.375 (1990) [hereinafter Steinhardt, Canon] (noting that cases rejecting the executive’s interpretation of treaties depart from the one-voice rationale).
295. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412
(1964) (“The courts[’] . . . powers to further the national interest in foreign affairs are necessarily circumscribed as compared with those of the political
branches . . . .”).
296. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 36–38, 42–43 (noting examples of disagreement between the courts and political branches).
297. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–25
(2012).
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executing International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment. And
in Boumediene, the Court concluded that Congress had unconstitutionally attempted to deny the writ of habeas corpus to de299
tainees at Guantánamo. In its separation of powers dimensions, then, the one-voice doctrine contends with a practice that
involves multiple federal players.
2. Federalism
Just as Supreme Court practice recognizes foreign affairs
authority beyond the President in Congress and the courts,
Court precedent leaves room for state action bearing on foreign
300
affairs. The Court has made room for such action, in part, by
increasingly leaving preemption decisions to the political
301
branches. In 1979, the Court struck a California property tax
298. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499–500 (2008).
299. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).
300. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 447 (“[T]he Court’s one-voice statements
have always been broader than the Court’s actual decisions, which have not in
fact allowed the federal government unfettered power in foreign affairs.”).
301. Compare Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
456–57 (1979), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298,
330–31 (1994) (evidencing a trend away from dormant preemption in foreign
commerce arena); compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1968),
with Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428–29 (2003) (evidencing a
trend away from dormant preemption in foreign affairs preemption arena);
compare Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941), with Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (arguably evidencing a trend
away from dormant preemption in statutory preemption arena). The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012),
might be read as interrupting the trend away from dormant preemption in the
statutory preemption context. In the historic Hines case, the Court stated in
deciding whether state “law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes . . . of Congress,” that “it is of importance that
[the state] legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one
aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded
imperatively to demand broad national authority.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67–68.
In other words, obstacle preemption analysis in the area of foreign affairs was
stacked against the state with a dormant component. In Crosby, by contrast,
the Court expressly declined to comment on dormant preemption, relying instead on the conclusion that a state purchasing law designed to promote human rights in Burma stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the similar
goals of a federal statute. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371, 372–86 & n.8. But cf.
BARRY R. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2007) (noting widely
divergent interpretations of Crosby, including interpretations that read Crosby
as essentially a case of dormant preemption). In Arizona, the Court cited
Hines in emphasizing immigration policy’s connection to the nation’s foreign
affairs and foreign standing. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–99. Moreover, as to
one of the three state law provisions the Court found preempted, the Court
noted that “decisions of [the type addressed by the state provision (that is, re-
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because it interfered with a generic need for federal uniformity
302
in regulating foreign commerce. This same need was coupled
with executive branch and foreign opposition in the 1994 Bar303
clays Bank suit, but the Court upheld the California tax
scheme in Barclays Bank on the ground that Congress has the
power to regulate foreign commerce and Congress had demon304
strated a “willingness to tolerate” California’s methodology.
Since it is arguably more difficult for the political branches to
create preemptive statutes, international agreements, or even
policies than it is for the judiciary to preempt state action on
dormant constitutional grounds, the trend toward political
preemption leaves more space for the states to engage in for305
eign affairs–related behavior.
In addition to expecting more involvement from the political branches in preemption matters, the Court has resisted the
immediate judicial enforcement of the primary sources of inter306
national law—treaties and customary international law —
absent congressional execution or incorporation of these
movability decisions)] touch on foreign relations and must be made with one
voice.” Id. at 2506–07. While this point appears to be cumulative rather than
dispositive in the Court’s obstacle preemption analysis, it arguably partakes of
dormant preemption in a way that parallels Hines more closely than Crosby.
For additional discussion of the trend away from dormant preemption, see, for
example, Bradley, supra note 5, at 447–48; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 983;
Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 624.
302. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448–54 (repeatedly referencing the need
for national uniformity). Halberstam reads Japan Line differently, and consistent with Barclays Bank, by emphasizing the Court’s reliance, not on the
general need for uniformity, but on a national policy to preempt California’s
law. See Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1063–66.
303. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 302–03, 311, 320–31 (referencing the
need for national uniformity); id. at 328–30 & n.30 (noting executive branch
opposition); id. at 320, 324 & n.22, 328 (noting foreign opposition). But cf. supra note 46.
304. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 327; see id. at 303, 324, 326–27, 329–31;
see also Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9–13 (1986)
(upholding state taxation because “the Foreign Commerce Clause [does not]
insist[] that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice” and the
federal government had adopted a policy permitting state taxation). As recognized by the Court in Crosby, Barclays Bank stands for the proposition that
Congress can exercise its authority in ways inconsistent with executive or foreign preferences. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 385
(2000).
305. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 624.
306. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (identifying sources of international law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987) (same).
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308

sources. The Court in Medellín endorsed a broad notion of
non-self-execution that will render more treaties non-self309
executing. Such treaties do not preempt state law until executed through legislation, preserving state law unless and until
310
such legislation is passed.
Similarly, in Sosa v. Alvarez311
Machain the Court suggested that federal courts may enforce
customary international law to preempt state law only when
312
authorized to do so by the Constitution or Congress. These
cases reduce preemption of state laws affecting foreign relations. Thus, even as constitutional text, structure, and history
provide significant (though not complete) support for the onevoice doctrine in its federalist dimension, Supreme Court practice leaves room for state actions affecting foreign affairs.
C. STATE PRACTICE
Not only do states possess significant leeway to affect foreign affairs as a matter of doctrine, but state (and other local)
practice includes a wide range of behaviors that impact foreign
313
relations, often with federal acquiescence or encouragement.
307. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 624–25
(discussing a trend away from direct judicial enforcement of international
law).
308. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Medellín considered whether a
judgment of the International Court of Justice was judicially enforceable federal law. See id. at 498–99. The Court concluded that it was not. See id.
309. See David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?:
Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228,
2264–65, 2286–89 (2010) [hereinafter Moore, Equivalence]; David H. Moore,
Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of International
Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 490–91 (2010).
310. Then, technically, “it is the implementing legislation, rather than the
agreement itself, that is given effect as [U.S.] law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, cmt. h (1987).
311. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
312. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 259, at 873, 892, 902–09,
935–36 (arguing that following Sosa, customary international law becomes enforceable federal law on constitutional or congressional authorization); Moore,
Emerging Uniformity, supra note 291, at 1, 8, 31–37, 48–49 (arguing that under Sosa, customary international law is enforceable by federal courts when
the political branches so authorize).
313. Many scholars have documented this phenomenon. See, e.g., Richard
B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
821, 821–22, 826–27 (1989) (identifying foreign relations activities in which
states participate); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 991–1006 (discussing historical
and current state involvement in foreign affairs and federal response to the
same); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1634–39, 1674–78 (discussing state actions bearing on foreign affairs and federal acceptance of such actions);
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1027–47 (canvassing a range of state activities
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In the arena of international economic policy, the federal government has been particularly inclusive of states—keeping
states informed, soliciting their advice, and including them in
international negotiation and dispute resolution—and has done
so not just informally but through statutory or other formal
314
mechanisms. States have been influential in affecting federal
315
policy in this arena. States also affect foreign affairs outside
the federal framework. To cite but a few examples, states sometimes go further than the federal government in trying to
achieve international goals, such as decreasing greenhouse gas
316
emissions. States adopt laws or resolutions implementing international law or taking positions on foreign policy issues on
317
the one hand, and commit their own international law viola318
tions on the other. States enact “Buy American” statutes requiring use of domestic over foreign products, and at the same
time adopt procurement and divestment laws designed to
bearing on foreign affairs, some of which have been embraced by the federal
government); Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 374–75
(“[T]he category of state laws having some potential effect upon foreign policy
is unmanageably broad.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1130–34 (noting that “the
orthodoxy of a federal monopoly[ over foreign affairs] . . . never really existed”
as “[s]tates have always had an effect on U.S. foreign relations”); Young, supra
note 9, at 415–23 (2002) (dismissing the assertion that states do not exist in
foreign affairs as silly and excessively formal in light of states’ current and increasing relevance in foreign affairs); cf. Yishai Blank, The City and the World,
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 922–25, 930–32 (2006) (discussing cities’ involvement in international relations). But cf. Spiro, Federalism, supra note
105, at 1258 (rejecting the “suggestion that state-level activity may now be
unproblematic because in some cases Congress may ‘agree’ with it”).
314. See Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1040–44 & nn.143, 153. The federal
government has also included states “in the negotiation of international wildlife treaties” given the states’ “superior knowledge of implementation issues.”
Id. at 1046 n.163.
315. See id. at 1040–41 & n.136, 1046.
316. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 9, at 500–01 (noting state adoption of uniform
laws that implement provisions of treaties the United States has not ratified);
Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57
EMORY L.J. 31, 34–35, 60–62 (2007) (discussing the role of state and local officials in incorporating international norms, including norms of the Kyoto Protocol); Felicity Barringer & Kate Galbraith, States Aim to Cut Gases by Making Polluters Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A17 (discussing several
states’ actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases notwithstanding federal failure to pursue such efforts).
317. See Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826–27; Cleveland, supra note 1, at
993 & n.125; Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1033 & nn.97–98, 1039 n.130; Ku,
supra note 9, at 461, 463, 481–85, 490; Resnik, supra note 316, at 45–51, 56–
62.
318. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 998–1001.
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achieve foreign policy goals like the historic dismantling of
319
apartheid. Alone and in combination with each other and
with foreign entities, states work to attract foreign trade and
320
investment through incentives, missions, and foreign offices.
321
They likewise engage in cultural and educational exchanges.
State courts hear cases involving foreign states, foreign offi322
cials, and international law. And states apply their laws, including their capital punishment law, to foreign or even U.S.
323
nationals with international repercussions.
Thus, notwithstanding the arguably strong footing of the federalist dimension
of the one-voice doctrine, it remains inconsistent, at least at the

319. See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania Buy American statute); Cleveland, supra
note 1, at 995–98 (discussing state spending efforts motivated by foreign policy, including Buy American laws); Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1033 & n.98,
1039 n.130 (noting procurement and divestment efforts aimed at Burma and
Northern Ireland as well as Buy American laws); Elizabeth Trachy, Comment,
State & Local Economic Sanctions: The Constitutionality of New York’s Divestment Actions and the Sudan Accountability & Divestment Act of 2007, 74
ALB. L. REV. 1019, 1019–22, 1030–32, 1038–40 (2011) (describing state divestment efforts motivated by foreign affairs concerns).
320. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826; Cleveland, supra note 1,
at 994; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1674 & n.230; Halberstam, supra note 18,
at 1028–32 & nn.73–74; Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1248–49; Nick
Miroff & William Booth, Middle-class Mexicans Snap Up More Products ‘Made
in the USA’, WASH. POST, Sept. 9. 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/middle-class-mexicans-snap-up-more-products-made-in
-usa/2012/09/09/27c9d1b4-f212-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html (noting a
trade mission of the Colorado governor to Mexico and lucrative exports to Mexico from U.S. states); see also Swaine, supra note 8, at 1239 (noting that
“states have competed for overseas business since they were colonies”).
Halberstam identifies “international economic development . . . [as] perhaps
the most significant area of state foreign policy activity.” Halberstam, supra
note 18, at 1028.
321. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826; Halberstam, supra note
18, at 1032–33. These exchanges include sister-city relationships that have at
times “preceded formal diplomatic ties at the national level” and have brought
“into focus human rights and social justice issues otherwise neglected at the
federal level.” Id. at 1032–33 & nn.92–93.
322. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993. Indeed, Professor Ku asserts that
state courts (and other bodies) have played a significant role in developing
principles of international law. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 9, at 461 & n.13, 476–
81, 484, 486.
323. See Bilder, supra note 313, at 826; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 991–92,
999–1000; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1634–36, 1672–73; Ku, supra note 9,
at 491; Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1251–52 & n.130, 1264.
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margins, with the Constitution and, more deeply, with prece324
dent and practice.
VIII. THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S FUNCTIONAL
FAILINGS
The one-voice doctrine likewise rests on functional presumptions that are faulty or incomplete. In identifying this failing, the goal is not to prove that functional arguments invariably favor the designation of another player or multiple players
to exercise the nation’s voice—undoubtedly, there remains value, for example, in preventing state action that shifts foreign
affairs costs to the nation as a whole—but to identify significant cracks in the one-voice doctrine’s functional footing in both
its federalist and separation of powers dimensions.
A. ALONG THE FEDERALIST DIMENSION
The one-voice doctrine in its federalist dimension maintains that “[o]ur system of government is such that the interest
of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free
325
from local interference.” This reasoning is most compelling in
the traditional areas of foreign affairs: military matters and
326
“diplomatic issues” such as treaty making. As foreign relations has expanded to include new issues and actors and globalization has eroded the distinction between foreign and domestic, state “interest in the regulation of foreign relations” has
327
justifiably increased. The imperative that federal foreign au328
thority remain “free from [local] interference” has correspond329
ingly softened.
324. But cf. Swaine, supra note 8, at 1237 (characterizing as “overstated”
the notion that “[t]he federal government has . . . yielded its international role
to the states”).
325. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442–43 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting same).
326. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1670; cf. Ku, supra note 9, at 527–28 (asserting that “the states have more often than not been responsible for fulfilling
. . . international obligations” that “intersect[] directly with areas of traditional
state control” and that federalist and separation of powers values may outweigh the interest in national responsibility for insignificant international obligations).
327. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671–78.
328. Id. at 1620.
329. See id. at 1677. With regard to international obligations that are not
particularly significant, allowance of state participation may have always been

1018

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:953

330

The imperative derives in part from the presumption
that if a state takes action in foreign affairs, the results will be
331
detrimental, and not just for the state but for the United
332
States as a whole.
This presumption falters on several
high. See Ku, supra note 9, at 527–28.
330. See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1237 (noting that “[t]he exclusive federal
authority to control foreign relations was premised on several simple propositions,” including the principle that “multiple entreaties robbed the nation of
the uniformity, credibility, and critical bargaining mass necessary to achieve
advantageous treaties and stave off adverse actions,” that “separate state action risked retaliation against the nation as a whole,” and that “uniformity
would enhance national pride and dignity, thus indirectly assisting in foreign
relations, and serve as a bulwark against internal collapse due to conflicting
interests”).
331. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 578 (1840) (plurality opinion) (noting that differing state approaches to extradition “would not
be well calculated to preserve respect abroad or union at home”); Bilder, supra
note 313, at 827 (noting the argument that the “achievement of U.S. foreign
[policy] requires that other nations perceive our foreign policy as unified and
coherent” and that state involvement in foreign affairs “may undermine the
conduct of U.S. foreign relations and the credibility of our negotiating posture
by conveying the appearance of disagreement, confusion, uncertainty and
weakness in our Government’s stated foreign policy positions”).
332. As the Court reasoned in Chy Lung:
[If an international claim resulting from California law be made on
the United States, u]pon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no
exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a
difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse,
would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If we should conclude
that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the injury, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of
these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for
this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to
pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable
to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit
to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875). Many cases repeat this
theme. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (noting
that “[i]mmigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation”); Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue,
477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (explaining that a presumption in favor of uniformity prevails in foreign commerce cases where “the Federal Government has remained
silent” in order to “ensur[e] that the conduct of individual States does not work
to the detriment of the Nation as a whole”); id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (decrying state action that might interfere with the achievement of federal international tax policy by triggering retaliation that will be suffered by the
broader nation); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194
(1983) (noting, in assessing whether a California tax “violate[d] the ‘one voice’
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grounds. First, as Judith Resnik has observed, “[d]espite the
ideology of each state acting alone . . . the practice is increas333
ingly coordinated.” Externalities felt by the nation as a whole
due to acts taken by many states may be less troubling than externalities produced by a single state. Second, as Peter Spiro
has argued, the emergence of sub-state actors in foreign affairs
334
who are “dependent on the global economy” has created a
world in which foreign countries can identify and target the
U.S. state that is the source of a foreign affairs offense, rather
335
than target the United States as a whole. Moreover, if “undifferentiated retaliation” occurs in a post-Cold War world, it is
336
likely to be less severe than in prior times. The reduced risk

standard,” that “a state tax . . . [risks] offending our foreign trading partners
and leading them to retaliate against the Nation as a whole”); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449–50 & n.16, 453 (1979) (quoting Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942)
(“If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences
might ensue[; t]he nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created
difficulties with a foreign power.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63–64
(1941) (quoting Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279); see also Halberstam, supra note 18,
at 1021–27 (documenting this theme in the Supreme Court’s foreign affairs
jurisprudence).
333. Resnik, supra note 316, at 42.
334. Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1261.
335. See e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 692–94 & nn.170–71 (2002); Spiro, Federalism,
supra note 105, at 1224–26, 1259–70, 1275. But cf. Goldsmith, supra note 12,
at 1679 n.253 (noting that the two examples of offending state polices cited by
Spiro produced “national as well as local protests” and acknowledging Spiro’s
concession that such examples are “a slim basis on which to discern a trend”
(quoting Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of DemiSovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 166 (1994))); Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 372–73 (stating that “it remains difficult to build
an affirmative case for state interference in foreign policy” on Spiro’s assertion); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1240–42 (questioning the prevalence “of ‘targeted retaliation,’” noting, for example, that even when countries target offending
states, they also pressure the national government). This disaggregation of the
state may also have separation of powers implications. First, Jean Galbraith
argues that designation of the President as sole organ derives in part from international law’s “need for a single representative” of each nation. See Galbraith, supra note 69, at 1012–15 & n.62. As international law looks less for a
single representative, the President’s claim as sole organ likewise weakens.
See id. at 1043–44 & n.169. Second, Robert Knowles asserts that, as “America’s current structure of government has existed for” more than two hundred
years, foreign officials ought to understand that the federal branches may
reach different conclusions. Knowles, supra note 9, at 132. See also id. at 151.
336. See Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1226, 1242, 1246–47, 1258–
59.
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of retaliation against the United States as a whole reduces the
337
need to ensure federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.
Third, state action does not inevitably produce detrimental
338
effects. It can produce the opposite result as well, and not just
for the individual state. State action may improve the standing
of the whole United States in international affairs. Consider
the potential foreign relations effects of some of the state prac339
tices described above. State exchange and similar programs
340
can foster friendly relations. State efforts to attract foreign
business and investment, which may be more effective than
341
federal efforts to do so, can strengthen the U.S. economy.
States can also serve U.S. interests by furthering, or influ342
encing, U.S. foreign policy for the better. For example, state
procurement or divestiture measures targeting foreign regimes
or human rights practices may secure beneficial results until
Congress enacts a federal scheme, which may or may not re343
place the state regimes. State efforts may even spur enact344
ment of federal schemes or other federal responses. Alternatively, the federal government may wish to rely solely, and
337. See id. at 1226 (“In the new model, there is no justification for the
courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face of contrary state-level preferences.”).
338. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1677–78 (briefly noting ways in
which state involvement in modern foreign affairs can benefit the United
States); Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1016–17, 1027–47 (developing the
theme that state foreign affairs activity can benefit the United States).
339. See supra Part VII.C.
340. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 320 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, supra
note 12, at 1676–78; Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1031.
342. This, of course, assumes that actions that might benefit the United
States are not defined exclusively by actions the federal government is willing
to take.
343. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387 & nn.25–
26 (2000); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 995–98, 1001–02, 1010–12, 1014; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1677.
344. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 995 (describing state responses to
apartheid that “mobilize[d] U.S. support for sanctions against South Africa”);
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1034–38, 1040 (describing state responses to
the Arab League boycott, apartheid, and Nazi-era abuses that generated federal action). Interestingly, sometimes the federal government does not adopt a
statutory regime but mediates between the states and localities who threaten
sanctions on the one hand and the foreign entities threatened on the other, as
has occurred in the context of Holocaust claims. See id. at 1036–37. Whatever
the form of the federal response, Halberstam argues that the greatest benefit
of state participation in foreign relations is in “challenging the Nation to action.” Id. at 1057.
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perhaps coyly, on state efforts, thereby achieving foreign relations goals without taking federal action that might produce a
more strident response from targeted countries.
States may also produce international goodwill by taking
steps to comply with international law norms to which the federal government has not consented—for example, climate
345
change standards. States can likewise assist in complying
with international obligations the United States has assumed,
346
including obligations more easily fulfilled at the state level.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the United States to leave as347
pects of treaty compliance to the states. Congress has not
chosen to give the federal judiciary exclusive jurisdiction over
348
treaty claims, so treaties may be enforced in state courts.
Similarly, the United States ratifies various treaties pursuant
349
to reservations, understandings, and declarations that maintain that compliance with certain obligations—for example, obligations within areas of traditional state regulation—will be
350
carried out by state (or local) governments. To illustrate, the
345. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. State compliance with
such norms may also “contribute to the formation of [CIL].” Ku, supra note 9,
at 465, 530, 532.
346. See Ku, supra note 9, at 528–29 (“[S]tate institutions may be the most
effective mechanisms for achieving compliance with[, for example,] . . . . obligations to guarantee statutory notice in probate proceedings or exempt[] consuls from property taxes.”).
347. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374, 378 (1998) (per curiam)
(concluding that the Virginia governor, but not the Supreme Court, could stay
an execution in light of an International Court of Justice order requesting
postponement); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (noting that
“[f]requently the obligation of a treaty will be dependent on state law” and citing Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856), a case involving a treaty
that secured rights to French nationals to the extent permitted by state law);
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints
on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1360–63, 1370–86 (2006) [hereinafter Hollis, Executive Federalism] (discussing various ways in which the
federal government leaves treaty compliance to the states); Ku, supra note 9,
at 486–87, 489–90, 501–04, 506–15, 520–26 (discussing federal reliance on
states to implement both treaties and CIL). The federal government has supported state involvement in foreign affairs in other ways as well. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1674–77. For example, in adopting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, Congress generally retained state law as the rule of
decision in suits against foreign states. See id. at 1675.
348. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993.
349. Such reservations may prevent Congress “from passing implementing
legislation that would override state law” pursuant to the treaty. Ku, supra
note 9, at 462.
350. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993, 1003–04 & n.180, 1008–09
(discussing this practice and citing examples); Hollis, Executive Federalism,
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United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
351
Political Rights, one of two treaties forming the international
bill of rights, pursuant to the understanding that the “Covenant [would] be implemented by the Federal Government to the
extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and lo352
cal governments.” Leaving room for the states may have been
353
essential to U.S. ratification of the treaty, and makes the
states critical to the nation’s compliance with its treaty com354
mitments.
Not only does national treaty compliance sometimes fall to
the states, but state compliance can be important in resolving
international problems. For example, the United States faced
international pressure when the ICJ found that the United
States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
by failing to notify certain Mexican nationals on death row of
their Convention rights and ordered the United States to review and reconsider these nationals’ convictions and sentenc-

supra note 347, at 1378–81 (same). Similarly, in the trade arena, “[t]he federal
government . . . negotiated for a limitation of the [GATT procurement] code to
cover only the thirty-seven States that had declared their willingness to participate. . . . and negotiated for the inclusion of an annex listing specific procurement decisions exempted even in the case of participating States.”
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1042. It is unclear whether, on balance, “concessions to states in recent treaties and implementing legislation outweigh
parallel incursions into state sovereignty.” See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1237–
38 & n.381.
351. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
352. 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992); see also 140 CONG. REC. 14,326 (1994)
(including a similar federalism understanding in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195); 136 CONG. REC. 36,192 (1990) (including a similar
federalism reservation in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85).
353. Cf. Ku, supra note 9, at 530–32 (asserting that “[b]y leaving much of
the incorporation, implementation, and execution of international law to the
states, the federal government can confer the greatest amount of political legitimacy on the new international law,” which addresses “a nation-state’s interactions with its own nationals”).
354. See, e.g., BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 294, at 553; Ku, supra
note 9, at 525–26. For examples of federal reliance on state implementation of
treaty (and CIL) obligations, even in the absence of a federalism reservation or
treaty provision, see id. at 491–98, 501–04.
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355

es. In Medellín, the Supreme Court concluded that neither
the ICJ judgment nor a presidential memorandum attempting
to implement it could displace state procedural default laws
that might stand in the way of the mandated review and recon356
sideration. Justice Stevens, though agreeing with the majority, noted “that sometimes States must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the
Nation” and urged Texas to provide reconsideration notwith357
standing its procedural law. While Texas did not respond,
358
Oklahoma took steps consistent with that counsel. Oklahoma
courts reviewed the conviction and sentence of a death row inmate in light of the Vienna Convention violation he suffered,
and the Governor independently commuted the inmate’s sen359
tence to life without parole. Oklahoma’s actions served to deflect foreign affairs problems. Of course, just as states may effect compliance with U.S. obligations, states may serve as a
scapegoat for noncompliance as well. The overall point is that
360
state action in foreign affairs certainly can, but does not inevitably, generate negative consequences that will be suffered by
the nation as a whole.
B. ALONG THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS
Just as there are functional reasons for allowing states a
voice in foreign affairs, there are reasons for favoring, at times,
Congress or a multiplicity of federal voices in foreign affairs.
The one-voice doctrine assumes that U.S. interests are best
served through a unitary federal voice in international interactions. As recently summarized by Justice Breyer, “where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States

355. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 90, 106(1), 121, 153(4), 153(9) (Mar. 31).
356. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008).
357. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 536–37.
358. See id. at 537 & n.4.
359. See id. at 537 n.4. This example admittedly cuts two ways. On the one
hand, Texas law enforcement and Texas law generated both the breach of international law and the hurdle to enforcement of the ICJ mandate that produced foreign affairs problems. On the other hand, Oklahoma’s actions
demonstrate how states can remedy international problems.
360. See Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1249–50 (“[T]here continue
to be instances in which state-level action may undermine the national interest.”).
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to speak ‘with one voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly im361
portant.”
It is undoubtedly true that in certain circumstances U.S.
362
interests are served by a unified position.
The Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino Court, for example, believed
that the executive’s diplomatic efforts to address foreign expropriations of American citizens’ property could easily be under363
cut by court judgments on the expropriations’ legality. Especially if the expropriating state were a party to the suit, a
judgment that the expropriation is illegal could offend the
364
state; a judgment of legality would undercut the executive’s
claim to the contrary or intentional ambivalence on the ques365
tion. Yet, the presence of multiple U.S. voices in foreign relations can advance U.S. interests as well.

361. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438 (2012)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
362. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 711–12 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (predicting that the United States will fare worse in repatriation
negotiations with other countries in light of Court-authorized “judicial orders
requiring release of removable aliens”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 381–82 (2000) (assuming that the President will fare better in
interacting with other countries if he has broad authority and presents a coherent policy); POMEROY, supra note 77, at 447 (asserting that in treaty negotiations “one mind and will must always be more efficient . . . than a large deliberative assembly”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1242–43 (discussing “the
Framers’ argument that a federal monopoly is necessary in order to maximize
and apply American bargaining power”); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (noting “the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international
sphere”).
363. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430–33. But see id. at 462–68 & nn.25–26
(White, J., dissenting) (discounting these concerns and noting concerns for undercutting the executive that result from the Court’s approach to the act of
state doctrine—in particular, its conclusion that lack of clarity in international
law supports application of the doctrine and that the doctrine is a rule of decision rather than merely a basis for abstention).
364. See id. at 431–32, 437 (majority opinion).
365. See id. at 432, 437. Judicial determinations of legality might likewise
undercut executive efforts to alter international law norms. See id. at 432–33.
Even judicial uncertainty regarding legality might hamper the executive. Id.
at 433. Relatedly, judicial doctrines requiring the executive to take a position
on the appropriateness of judicial resolution of a case could interfere with the
executive’s diplomatic strategy. Id. at 436. But see id. at 462, 468–72 (White,
J., dissenting) (rejecting this contention and instead expressing willingness to
abstain from adjudication, at least temporarily, if the executive so petitions).
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The participation of other domestic actors may correct
366
flaws or excesses in presidential policy. Participation may also help to secure U.S. interests. Game theorists and negotiation
analysts agree that negotiation strength can be increased if the
negotiator must obtain domestic approval for any proposed
367
agreement.
Such an arrangement produces a two-level
368
game. In one game the negotiator interacts with the negotiator of the other states; in the other she interacts with the do369
mestic forces that must ratify any agreement formed. Under
these conditions, game theory “predicts that while domestic
constraints may decrease the likelihood of a mutually satisfactory [and efficient] accord . . . they increase the likelihood that
any agreement actually achieved will favor the constrained
370
side.” The President, for example, may be able to secure concessions from other countries on the threat that the Senate or

366. Adler, supra note 68, at 23–24 (“The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter the abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational
action, and unaccountable behavior.”).
367. See Frederick W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT’L
ORG. 793, 796–805, 809–17 (1992) (employing a negotiation analysis lens);
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 437–41, 443–44, 448–50, 452 (1988) (employing a
game theory lens); see also R.B. Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 837, 839 (1975) (noting the argument of a U.S. Senator that encouraging the executive to obtain Senate approval of certain claims
settlement agreements with other countries “should appreciably strengthen
the hand of our Government in all such negotiations” (quoting 109 CONG. REC.
25,149 (1963))).
368. See Putnam, supra note 367, at 434; Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory
and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95, 108
(1996).
369. See Putnam, supra note 367, at 434–37; see also Schmidt, supra note
368, at 108–09. The requirement of domestic buy-off can delay and complicate
the treatymaking process. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF NEGOTIATION 166, 170–81 (1982) (providing an example from the negotiation of the Panama Canal treaties).
370. Swaine, supra note 8, at 1243; see Putnam, supra note 367, at 437–41,
443–44, 448–50, 452; Schmidt, supra note 368, at 117, 119–20; see also Mayer,
supra note 367, at 804 (employing a negotiation analysis lens). At the same
time, uncertainty regarding the prospect of ratification by one state may lead
the other negotiating state to “demand more generous side-payments” on other
issues. Putnam, supra note 367, at 453. And providing accurate information
about the prospects of ratification may be beneficial “when the negotiators are
seeking novel packages that might improve both sides’ positions.” Id.
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Congress will not approve certain obligations. Thus, in negotiating the Panama Canal Treaty, “Secretary of state Vance
warned the Panamanians several times . . . that the new treaty
would have to be acceptable to at least sixty-seven senators,”
and “[President] Carter, in a personal letter to [Panamanian
leader] Torrijos, warned that further concessions by the United
States would seriously threaten chances for Senate ratifica372
tion.” Parallel American and foreign examples might be cit373
ed.

371. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 19
(1980) (“[T]he power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make
concessions and to meet demands.”); Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra
note 204, at 147, 233–36 (arguing that if U.S. negotiators “can demonstrate to
their negotiating partners that they are constrained by the need to obtain congressional approval, they may be able to refuse to make concessions that they
would otherwise need to make to secure a deal”); Mayer, supra note 367, at
796 (“U.S. negotiators . . . have long used the threat of congressional rejection
as a device for leveraging concessions at the bargaining table.”); Putnam, supra note 367, at 440, 448 (“The difficulties of winning congressional ratification are often exploited by American negotiators.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at
1244 (noting that the Constitution’s assignment of “negotiation to a substantially independent President, while simultaneously liberating the Senate’s advice-and-consent function, meant that the President could reasonably assert
that agreements under discussion would have to satisfy a third party”). But cf.
Hollis, Executive Federalism, supra note 347, at 1395 (noting that attempts to
accommodate state interests in treaty negotiation can impair U.S. interests by
“depriving [the United States] of negotiating capital” or eliciting demands
from other states to treat federal and nonfederal states the same); Lindsay,
supra note 245, at 278–80 (discussing how congressional opposition can both
strengthen and weaken the President in international negotiations); Swaine,
supra note 8, at 1243–45 (explaining why adding state voices to negotiation
would undercut national interests).
372. WM. MARK HABEEB & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS 40, 42 (1986); see also Panama Canal—Defending the Canal,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/panama
-canal-defense.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (noting favorable treaty
amendments regarding preferential passage of U.S. vessels through the Panama Canal secured by the Senate).
373. See, e.g., Lillich, supra note 367, at 837, 839–44 & n.34, 846 (cheering
Congress’s blocking of an “unsatisfactory lump sum agreement” negotiated by
the executive “to settle the claims of U.S. nationals” whose property was nationalized by Czechoslovakia after World War II); Mayer, supra note 367, at
797 (postulating “that the power held by extreme factions in Israel’s domestic
political system . . . limits Israel’s ability to make territorial concessions and
thereby empowers Israel in its dealings with its Arab neighbors”); id. at 806,
810 (noting that a domestic agreement “to support production of the new Trident submarine with multiple warhead missiles. . . . blunt[ed] military objections to the [Salt I] deal . . . [but] may have weakened the U.S. bargaining position”).
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Similarly, the President might be able to invoke the position of Congress (or, returning to the previous section, states’
rights) to avoid participation in undesirable treaty regimes or
374
provisions. The United States arguably did so to evade efforts
at international private lawmaking grounded in civil as op375
posed to common law.
The United States might gain not only from the existence
of multiple governmental voices, but also from the efforts of
private actors to further international negotiations in what has
376
been called track two diplomacy. Indeed, technological advancements have made it virtually impossible to prevent private actors from having a voice in U.S. foreign relations, as evidenced by the fatal anti-American protests that erupted abroad
over a Florida pastor’s Koran burning or by the private video
coverage of Iranian protests that escaped Iran during the Arab
377
Spring.
The contrary notion that unity of position is best has its
roots in the view that foreign affairs are complex, unpredicta378
ble, and rife with risk of reprisal. In discussing the Presi374. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1075, 1241–42 & nn.551–52 (2000) (discussing invocations of states’
rights to avoid treaty-making).
375. See id. at 1242 n.551.
376. See, e.g., DALIA DASSA KAYE, RAND NAT’L SEC. RESEARCH DIV., TALKING TO THE ENEMY: TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA 105–06 (2007) (discussing the benefits of track two diplomacy), available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_
MG592.pdf; Charles Homans, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, FOREIGN
POLICY, Jul.–Aug. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/
track_ii_diplomacy (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (noting briefly the history of
track two diplomacy, including instances of its use in U.S. foreign relations).
377. See Taimoor Shah & Rod Nordland, Violence Continues in Afghanistan
Over Koran Burning in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at A5; Matthew
Weaver, Iran Protests: One-Man Video Channel That Is a Thorn in Tehran's
Side, GUARDIAN, June 11, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/
11/iran-protest-videos-youtube-mehdi; WSJ Staff, Protest Videos Trickle Out of
Iran, WALL ST. J. DISPATCH BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/dispatch/2011/02/14/protest-videos-trickle-out-of-iran/; see also Steinhardt, Canon, supra note 294, at 1192 (“[P]rivate initiatives add to the implausibility of a univocal foreign policy . . . .”); David Nakamura, White House
Denounces Dennis Rodman’s Trip to North Korea, WASH. POST POL. BLOG
(Mar. 4, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/
wp/2013/03/04/white-house-denounces-dennis-rodmans-trip-to-north-korea/
(providing an example of private travel affecting foreign affairs).
378. See Knowles, supra note 9, at 90–93, 111–27 (arguing that the claim
that “foreign affairs demand that the executive enjoy vast discretion” rests on
a classical realist view of international relations).
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dent’s preeminence in foreign affairs, for example, the Court in
Curtiss-Wright described the President’s foreign affairs power
as “very delicate” and described foreign affairs as a “vast external realm, with . . . important, complicated, delicate and mani379
fold problems.” The Court has also warned “that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading
to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another’s
380
subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.” This sort
381
of environment, the Court has noted, requires discretion. The
nation must be able to speak with one voice and that voice

379. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20
(1936); see also id. at 319 (“The nature of transactions with foreign nations . . .
requires caution . . . .” (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24
(1901))); id. at 320 (“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution . . . .”
(quoting Letter from George Washington to the House of Representatives, 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 193, 194 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896))); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421,
1437–38 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing decisionmaking in the area
of foreign affairs as “‘delicate’ and ‘complex’” in the course of explaining that
“[t]he Constitution primarily delegates the foreign affairs powers ‘to the political departments of the government’” (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291
(1981) (noting that Curtiss-Wright underscored “the volatile nature of problems confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national defense”); Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111 (stating that foreign policy decisions “are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy”); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 232 (1942) (observing that issues of foreign policy “are delicate matters”); id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that “diplomatic negotiations so easily founder” if the negotiators are explicit).
380. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941); see also Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979) (“[A] slight overlapping of
tax[ by multiple sovereigns] . . . might be deemed de minimis in a domestic
context[ but] assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations
and national sovereignty are concerned.”). But cf. Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 (1983) (rejecting the suggestion that Japan Line
produces “an absolute rule” prohibiting any overlapping taxation in foreign
commerce and stating instead that “[a]lthough double taxation in the foreign
commerce context deserves to receive close scrutiny, that scrutiny must take
into account the context in which the double taxation takes place and the alternatives reasonably available to the taxing State”).
381. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (“[I]f, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—is
to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation
which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”).
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must be sufficiently powerful to deal with the contingencies
382
that arise.
This reasoning fails to acknowledge that many foreign affairs decisions are routine and do not require haste or un383
bounded discretion. Moreover, the view of foreign affairs on
which this reasoning is based, though perhaps justified historically, arguably has less traction today. Technological advances
have made it easier (though by no means costless or fail proof)
to assess what is happening abroad, to understand the characteristics of other countries, and to communicate regarding problems. The development of international law and international
and nongovernmental organizations has likewise facilitated
communication, but perhaps more importantly has trained expectations and behavior. As a result, foreign affairs may be less
384
wild, unpredictable, and capricious than previously. Even if
foreign affairs have not changed in these ways, the threat of
repercussions from missteps or multiple voices in foreign af-

382. See id. at 319–22; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662
(1981) (“[The] world . . . presents each day some new challenge with which [the
President] must deal . . . .”); cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (finding a congressional power to regulate foreign affairs based, in part, on the
need for national power to respond to “the frictions that are unavoidable in a
world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests”),
overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255–57, 263, 267–68
(1967) (rejecting the congressional power, recognized in Perez, to strip someone of U.S. citizenship, without denying an implied congressional power to
regulate foreign affairs).
383. See Adler, supra note 68, at 24.
384. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2013) (noting scholarship that at least implicitly suggests that “[t]he proliferation of international organizations and
tribunals, the increasing supply and demand for international law, and the
declining utility of classical realist thinking, lead to the conclusion that lower
levels of deference to the President and a greater role for courts are preferable”) (footnotes omitted); Knowles, supra note 9, at 138–45 (arguing that the
claim for executive discretion rests on a classical realist view that is no longer
accurate in today’s “U.S.-led international order [that] is unipolar, hegemonic,
and, in some instances, imperial”); id. at 93, 152–58 (making similar arguments); id. at 105–06, 146 (noting liberal theory critiques of the need for judicial deference in foreign affairs); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 44
(referencing a State Department assertion “that changes in international
law . . . exclude some matters from the untrammeled discretion implied by the
term ‘foreign affairs’ and thereby narrow[] the proper reach of the ‘one-voice’
orthodoxy”). But see Abebe, supra, at 31–35 (questioning the constraint imposed by international and nongovernmental organizations and international
law on great powers).
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fairs is arguably reduced for the United States as a result of its
385
hegemonic status.
Moreover, because the President and Congress each repre386
sents and answers to the nation as a whole, it is less troubling when the President or Congress triggers foreign relations
problems than when the states, who speak for only a subset, do.
As between the President and Congress, there are clearly functional reasons for treating the President as the nation’s voice in
foreign affairs: the President’s ability to obtain information
about foreign countries, to form a unified policy, and to act with
387
speed and secrecy. Yet there are competing reasons to favor
Congress as the one voice. Congress, it is generally understood,
388
has authority to violate international law. In light of the
389
Take Care Clause, the President’s authority to violate is more
390
contested. If only one branch must act as the nation’s voice in
formulating and implementing foreign policy, arguably the
branch with the broader discretion ought to do so. Similarly,
given the importance of foreign affairs, perhaps the branch
with the greatest democratic legitimacy ought to take the lead
and responsibility. The President is elected every four years
through a single national election generally presenting only
385. See Abebe, supra note 384, at 39 (“When the United States is the superpower, the threat environment changes; states are reluctant to challenge
the United States. The kind of diplomatic skill required to achieve U.S. foreign
policy goals in a [multipolar world] is not as uniquely important . . . .”).
386. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)
(“[W]hen Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented . . . .”); cf.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the . . . states, is entrusted with
full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.”).
387. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21.
388. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “clearly has constitutional authority to” violate the customary international law of prescriptive jurisdiction);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be
construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international
agreement of the United States.”); id. § 115(1) (noting that a federal statute
may domestically supersede a prior treaty or provision of customary international law even if the result is a violation of international law).
389. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
390. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Political
Branches and the Law of Nations, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795, 1796–98
(2010) (noting that “[m]ost scholars agree that courts must uphold acts
of Congress that depart from the law of nations” but several scholars cite the
Take Care Clause to “argue[] that customary international law is judicially
enforceable against the President”).
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two competitive candidates. By contrast, members of Congress
are elected from smaller geographic regions and each region
generally boasts two viable candidates. Representatives are also elected more frequently. Again, if one branch must be chosen, from a democratic perspective, that branch should be Congress.
A final reason for depriving the other federal branches of a
voice in foreign affairs appears in Curtiss-Wright. There the
Court quoted favorably from a report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations asserting that “the interference of the
Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations [is] calculated to
diminish [the President’s] responsibility [to the Constitution]
and thereby to impair the best security for the national safe391
ty.” That is, the Senate might divert the President from faithfully following the Constitution, and the President’s own sense
of loyalty to the Constitution is the greatest check on misuse of
the treaty power. This reasoning borders on the ludicrous. The
Constitution is famous not for its reliance on each branch’s own
restraint, but on checks and balances. The system of checks
and balances operates not only in the context of domestic pow392
ers, but in relation to foreign affairs authority as well. One
need not look beyond the treaty power for support. The history
of the Treaty Clause reveals a strong preference for legislative
393
involvement in treatymaking.
Indeed, in convention, the
394
power to make treaties was originally vested in the Senate.
While some desired to shift that power to the President, others
feared abuse from the concentration of power in the President
395
alone. To protect against abuse, some even proposed a role for
396
the House of Representatives. The ultimate text, of course,
397
gave treatymaking to the President and Senate. The Senate’s
role was not limited, however, to approving treaties, but to
398
providing “Advice and Consent.” And the Senate could only
391. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–
1901, at 24 (1901)).
392. See, e.g., Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at
616–22, 626–32.
393. Id. at 626–32.
394. Id. at 626–27.
395. Id. at 627.
396. Id. at 628.
397. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
398. See id.; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at
628–29.
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399

approve by supermajority. The Senate thus serves as a check
on the abuse of power by the President. The judiciary similarly
400
can serve as a check on abuse by both the political branches.
In short, functional considerations do not uniformly favor the
one-voice doctrine’s concentration of foreign affairs power in the
federal government or the President.
IX. IMPLICATIONS
Having exposed the above features of the one-voice doctrine, it remains to emphasize that these features are flaws and
to consider the implications of these flaws for the future of this
prominent doctrine.
A. MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
The fact that the one-voice doctrine is employed along multiple dimensions is not itself problematic. This feature of the
doctrine arguably would not be troubling (a) if the different
contexts in which the doctrine is used were governed by the
same law, or (b) if the Court recognized that the doctrine applies in multiple contexts and applied the doctrine with sensitivity to the unique nature of the context at issue. Neither of
these contingencies prevails, however.
The dimensions along which the doctrine is applied all pre401
sent questions of constitutional structure. However, the answers to these questions are governed by different constitutional principles. To illustrate, the general role of the states in
foreign affairs is governed by the structure reflected in the
Tenth Amendment that “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo402
ple”; by the delegations made to the President, Congress, and

399. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Moore, Unconstitutional
Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 629.
400. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585–
89 (1952) (holding that the President lacked authority to seize domestic steel
mills in connection with the Korean War).
401. This is the case, at least, if one accepts that federal foreign affairs supremacy derives from the Constitution. But see United States v. CurtissWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–18 (1936) (claiming that federal foreign
affairs supremacy results not from the Constitution, but from the transfer of
sovereignty from Britain to the national government of the United States).
402. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–35
(1920) (invoking both the Tenth Amendment and “invisible radiation from the
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403

judiciary in Articles I–III; and by the prohibitions on state
404
involvement in foreign affairs in Article I, section 10. Specific
questions of state authority in foreign affairs may turn on dif405
ferent provisions from within this group. By contrast, the allocation of authority between the President and Congress is
406
407
governed by the provisions of, and interaction between, Articles I and II.
More troubling, it is not clear the Court has noticed the
uniqueness of the questions it is addressing when invoking the
one-voice doctrine. As mentioned, in Garamendi the Court addressed the constitutionality of a California statute that required insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose information about European insurance policies that were
in effect before and after World War II to facilitate recovery on
408
policies by Holocaust victims. The law was challenged as inconsistent with the policy reflected in executive agreements
President Clinton entered to address the problem of Holocaust
409
victim insurance policies that were not properly paid. There
is a sense in Garamendi that the strength of the national government’s claim to foreign affairs authority vis-à-vis the states
strengthened the majority’s perception of the scope of executive

general terms of the Tenth Amendment” in assessing the validity of a treaty
the United States had entered).
403. Articles I–III delegate, for example, the power to regulate foreign
commerce to Congress, the power to receive ambassadors to the President, and
the power to resolve controversies arising under treaties to the courts. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
404. Id. art. I, § 10.
405. Compare, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (Import-Export Clause), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298 (1994) (Foreign Commerce Clause).
406. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (authorizing Congress “[t]o declare War”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President Commander in Chief).
407. Hamilton and Madison, in their famous Pacificus-Helvidius debate,
disagreed on the interaction between Article I and II. While Madison believed
that Articles I and II’s enumerated grants of foreign affairs authority to the
President and Congress controlled the allocation of foreign affairs authority,
Hamilton maintained that Article I’s Vesting Clause located foreign affairs
power in the President with limited, express exception as enumerated in Articles I and II. Compare Madison, “Helvidius” Number 1, supra note 199, at 69–
72 (Madison as Helvidius), and Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2, supra note
201, at 81–84 (Madison as Helvidius), with Hamilton, supra note 74, at 36–42
(Hamilton as Pacificus).
408. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 409–10 (2003).
409. See id. at 401, 405–08, 413.

1034

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:953

power, leading to the conclusion that mere policies reflected in
410
sole executive agreements could preempt state law.
410. See id. at 401 (holding the state law preempted). For example, the
Court alternates between speaking of executive power and policy, and national
power and policy. Compare id. at 413 (referring to “foreign policy of the Executive”), and id. at 414 (referring to “executive authority to decide what [foreign]
policy should be”; “the President’s power to act in foreign affairs”; and the
scope of the President’s “independent authority to act” in foreign affairs), and
id. at 415 (citing to the President’s lead foreign affairs role, the President’s
unique responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, and presidential control over
foreign affairs), and id. at 419 (citing to executive conduct of foreign affairs
and to “the executive foreign relations power”), and id. at 420 (referring to “the
Executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs” and “the national Executive[’s] . . . responsibility to maintain the Nation’s relationships with other
countries”), and id. at 421 (referring to “Executive Branch diplomacy”), and id.
at 423 (referring to “effective exercise of the President’s power”), and id. at 424
n.14 (referring to “the President[’s] . . . considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues”), and
id. at 427 (referring to “the President . . . consistently [choosing] kid gloves” in
response to a foreign policy matter, the President’s foreign relations objectives,
“Executive Branch foreign policy,” and “Presidential foreign policy”), and id. at
429 (referring to “the President’s policy”), with id. at 401 (referring to “the National Government’s conduct of foreign relations”), and id. at 411 (referring to
“the National Government’s concern”), and id. at 413 (referring to “the National Government’s policy” and “the foreign relations power [allocated] to the
National Government”), and id. at 419 (referring to the effective conduct of the
foreign policy of the Nation), and id. at 419 n.11 (referring to “federal foreign
policy interest[s]” and to the established principle “that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National Government”), and id. at 420
(referring to “express foreign policy of the National Government”), and id. at
421 (referring to a foreign policy issue “the National Government has addressed” and “the national position” reflected in executive agreements), and
id. at 425 (referring to “a [foreign policy] goal espoused by the National Government”; “the National Government’s” force calibration “in dealing with” a
foreign policy issue; “express federal policy”; and resolving conflict with state
law “in the National Government’s favor”), and id. at 426 (referring to “the
National Government[’s interest] in devising its chosen mechanism for” addressing a foreign policy problem and to “the responsibility of the United
States”), and id. at 427 (referring to “conflict with national policy” and “the
National Government’s policy”). Of course, “national” is a proper descriptor of
presidential power exercised and policy adopted for the federal government,
but reference to national power and policy may reflect reliance on the strength
of national authority vis-à-vis the states to uphold the executive’s authority in
making foreign policy. Relatedly, the Court considers the import of
Zschernig—a case regarding federalism in foreign affairs—for the protection of
executive foreign relations authority. See id. at 419–20 (declining to decide
whether “a categorical choice between the” conflict and field preemption approaches manifest in the opinions in Zschernig was necessary to secure “respect for the executive foreign relations power”). The Court also acknowledges
that, given the absence of congressional authorization, the President did not
act with the plenary authority he had exercised in other preemption scenarios,
but that “conflict with the exercise of [the President’s considerable independent] authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law.” Id.
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A similar blending of issues addressed by the one-voice
doctrine is evident in Munaf, where the Court rejected the habeas petitions of two American citizens held in Iraq who sought
411
to avoid transfer to Iraqi authorities. In that case, the Court
refused to second guess the executive’s assessment that trans412
fer did not present a risk of torture. Independently evaluating that assessment, the Court reasoned, “would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and
undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in
413
this area.” In support of this invocation of the one-voice doctrine, the Court cited Madison’s oft-quoted statement from
Federalist 42: “If we are to be one nation in any respect, it
414
clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.” However, this
statement was made to defend the Constitution’s transfer of
415
authority from the states to the federal government. It concerned the vertical distribution of authority, not the horizontal
distribution between the political branches or between the political branches and the courts. Yet the Court relied on the
statement to support its conclusions concerning political
at 424 n.14. Finally, the majority perceives executive authority more broadly
than Justice Ginsburg in dissent, who is unwilling to derive preemptive policy
from executive agreements that do not address the precise issue or from the
statements of subordinate executive officials. See id. at 430, 438–43 & n.4
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
411. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679–81, 683–84 (2008) (describing
the facts of the case).
412. See id. at 700–02 (2008).
413. Id. at 702.
414. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
415. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (addressing “powers lodged in the General Government”); id. (asserting that powers “which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations . . . .
form[] an obvious and essential branch of the f[e]deral administration”); id.
(noting that the Constitution removes the impediment to the treaty power
“under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the
States”); id. at 280–81 (“The power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs
with equal propriety to the general government; and is a still greater improvement on the articles of confederation. . . . [which] leave it in the power of
any indiscreet member to embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.”); id.
at 281 (“The regulation of foreign commerce . . . has been too fully discussed to
need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal administration.”); see also Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at
383–84 (explaining that in making this oft-quoted statement “Madison was
justifying the grant of particular foreign relations powers to the federal government” and was “not suggesting a generalized constitutional preclusion of
the states”).
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branch, and particularly executive, primacy in relation to the
416
judiciary.
Curtiss-Wright manifests a similar, though more subtle,
conflation of issues. The question in Curtiss-Wright was whether Congress had abdicated its responsibilities and unconstitutionally delegated lawmaking authority to the President
through a joint resolution empowering the President to criminalize U.S. arms sales to the countries engaged in the Chaco
417
War. In building to the conclusion that the President acted
constitutionally in executing the resolution, the Court noted the
unique nature of federal foreign affairs authority and the fact
that that authority rests on “the irrefutable postulate that
though the states were several[,] their people in respect of for418
eign affairs were one.” The strength of federal foreign affairs
authority vis-à-vis the states was again used to lay the
groundwork for a finding of presidential authority.
These examples suggest that the Court has not consistently recognized the different questions to which the one-voice doctrine has been applied. Again, this might not be troubling if the
Court nonetheless answered the question presented based on
reasoning relevant to that question. However, the above cases
suggest that the one-voice doctrine in its strong, federalist dimension has been used horizontally to expand the scope of
419
presidential power. Carelessness concerning the different dimensions of the doctrine has arguably produced a serious second generation problem—the aggrandizement of executive authority. Given the protean nature of the one-voice doctrine, the
416. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702–03. In Garamendi, the Court rightly cited
this and similar statements from the Federalist Papers in noting why the
Constitution allocated “foreign relations power to the National Government in
the first place.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003) (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 n.16 (2000) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)) (“[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART.”)); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 299 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (identifying “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate
to foreign powers”); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 & nn.9, 11
(1941) (quoting Madison and other Founding-era sources to establish the federalist division of foreign affairs authority).
417. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314–15
(1936).
418. Id. at 317; see id. at 315–19 (asserting that federal foreign affairs
powers, unlike federal domestic powers, did not derive from the states); id. at
329 (upholding the discretion vested in the President).
419. See supra notes 408–18 and accompanying text.
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risk remains that errors of this type will not only continue but
expand.
B. MULTIPLE THEORIES
Greater care in recognizing the different issues the onevoice doctrine addresses might solve this problem and justify
continued use of the doctrine if it were not for another of the
doctrine’s features: its reflection of varying approaches to con420
stitutional interpretation. The fact that a doctrine straddles
multiple theories of constitutional interpretation may be a virtue rather than a vice. A doctrine might be hailed for capturing
the outcome or the core analysis of multiple theories. The onevoice doctrine straddles multiple theories in a more problematic
way, however. The Court’s one-voice jurisprudence does not
achieve theoretical accord but, as noted above, alternates be421
tween competing theories. At a minimum, then, the one-voice
doctrine obscures the Court’s theoretical approach. The result
is that the Court invokes the doctrine, not only without acknowledging the different contexts in which it is used, but
without acknowledging or justifying the varying theoretical
perspectives motivating the doctrine. Indeed, sometimes the
422
theory motivating the doctrine is simply left unclear.
The Court has done better in other contexts at making
transparent its approach to constitutional interpretation. Take,
for example, the issue of the extraterritorial reach of Bill of
Rights limitations on federal action. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court considered “whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and lo423
cated in a foreign country.” Justice Rehnquist for the majori424
425
ty relied primarily on constitutional text, history, and prec426
427
edent,
and secondarily on functional considerations,
in
420. See supra Part V.
421. See supra Part V.
422. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (citing the need for “single-voiced statement of the Government’s views” evidently as a functional reason for treating an issue as a political question, rather than as shorthand for a
judgment that the Constitution designates the President or Congress as the
nation’s sole voice).
423. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
424. See id. at 265–66, 269, 274.
425. See id. at 266–68, 274.
426. See id. at 268–74.
427. See id. at 273–74.
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concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply. Justice Kennedy, while fundamentally agreeing with the majority,
wrote separately to discount the Court’s textual analysis and
emphasize the importance of functional considerations in cali429
brating the extraterritorial reach of Bill of Rights guarantees.
Justice Kennedy’s functional approach became the majority’s in
Boumediene, which concerned the constitutional rights of alien
430
detainees at Guantánamo. Whatever the merits of the shift in
Boumediene, it was, at a minimum, apparent.
The Court could, of course, be more transparent regarding
the theoretical approach reflected in the one-voice doctrine in
future cases. Yet the doctrine’s theoretical multiplicity combined with its multiple dimensions make it difficult to conceive
of a unitary one-voice doctrine going forward.
C. INCONSISTENCY WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Not only does the one-voice doctrine obscure the varying
constitutional methodologies employed and conflate the constitutional questions presented, the doctrine can lead to unconstitutional results. As explained above, the Constitution nowhere
vests foreign affairs power in one branch of the federal govern431
ment nor utterly precludes its exercise by the states. When
the doctrine suggests otherwise it lacks constitutional footing
and points toward unconstitutional results. The Court’s actual
practice, of course, reveals that the Justices have not followed
the one-voice doctrine to its broadest conclusions. Even while
retaining the one-voice doctrine, the Court has recognized the
432
shared nature of foreign affairs power. This is comforting as
it suggests that the most flagrantly unconstitutional conclusions that might result from the doctrine might not materialize
in the Court. The level of comfort declines, however, upon the
realization that the most one can say is that these results may
not materialize. The expansiveness and staying power of the
doctrine generate risk that the doctrine will yet be used to exceed constitutional limits. Moreover, even if the risk does not
materialize in the Supreme Court, the doctrine invigorates the
executive to claim broad authority outside the courts and may
428. See id. at 261, 274–75.
429. See id. at 275–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
430. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732, 766–71, 793–97 (2008);
see also Moore, Equivalence, supra note 309, at 2258–64.
431. See supra Part VI.
432. See supra Part VII.B.
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provide Congress cover for accepting those claims. It might
also dissuade constitutional action by the states or more critical
434
review by lower courts.
The constitutional risks posed by the broadest version of
the one-voice doctrine might not persist if the doctrine were
trimmed. It might be appropriate, based on a review of constitutional text, structure, and history, to label the President the
one voice for certain purposes—perhaps deciding which ambassadors to receive. A cropped version of the doctrine along these
lines, however, would not be particularly helpful. First, there
would be no need to invoke the one-voice metaphor in support
of this conclusion. The Court could simply hold, for reasons of
text, structure, and/or history, that the President possesses exclusive power to accredit ambassadors. Second, there are likely
few, if any, foreign affairs powers that are exclusively assigned
to a single actor. Even in reliance on express textual grants like
the assignment of foreign commerce power to Congress, it may
be misleading to describe Congress as the nation’s foreign
commerce voice. The President can certainly negotiate treaties
435
governing foreign commerce, and the courts might preempt
state action unconstitutionally interfering with Congress’s
436
power so that Congress is ultimately not alone in this area.
Third, if there are contexts in which the one-voice label is accurate, the label now carries sufficient baggage that it may lead
to inaccurate assumptions or extensions. As a result, even the
retention of a much narrower version of the one-voice doctrine
is problematic.

433. See supra notes 65, 70 and accompanying text.
434. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067,
1075–77 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Zschernig—notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s failure to do so since Zschernig was decided—to preempt a California
statute facilitating insurance claims by “Armenian Genocide victim[s]” because the statute did not “address[] an area of traditional state responsibility”
and “intrude[d] on the federal government’s exclusive power to conduct and
regulate foreign affairs”); In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113,
117–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on Garamendi and its one-voice rationale to
dismiss state law Holocaust claims against an Italian insurer as inconsistent
with federal policy notwithstanding the absence of an executive agreement
with Italy).
435. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the authority
to enter into treaties).
436. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
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D. INCONSISTENCY WITH PRACTICE
The problems that arise from the one-voice doctrine’s inconsistency with constitutional text, structure, and history are,
of course, grounded in the assumption that the Constitution is
properly interpreted by reference to those sources. The Supreme Court has recognized that while historical practice does
437
not create constitutional power in the President, “‘a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge
of the Congress and never before questioned,’ can ‘raise a presumption’” of congressional consent which can in turn “be
treated as a ‘gloss on Executive Power vested in the Presi438
dent.’” The principle that practice may influence constitutional meaning, however, holds out little hope for the future viability of the one-voice doctrine. Even if the principle might, as
would be necessary to fully retain the doctrine, also affect constitutional understanding of congressional, judicial, and state
power, and even if the principle could trump contrary constitutional text, structure, and history, practice does not provide sufficient support for the one-voice doctrine. As the history at the
outset of this Article demonstrates, the one-voice doctrine is not
entirely a recent invention, even if it has been strengthened by
439
key twentieth-century precedents. At the same time, the doctrine has not met a consistent reception in the Supreme Court,
let alone in Congress, the political branches generally, or the
440
states. As a result, it would be exceedingly difficult to argue
that the one-voice doctrine should survive as a reflection of actual practice.
Practice is relevant to the doctrine’s fate for another reason
as well. Practice provides empirical evidence that arguably
weakens any presumption that the political branches prefer
preemption of state action bearing on foreign affairs or that na441
tional uniformity is best. As these presumptions fade, it is
437. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008) (“[T]he Court has
been careful to note that ‘[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686
(1981))).
438. Id. at 531 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686) (some internal
quotation marks omitted).
439. See supra Part II.
440. See supra Part VII.
441. I say arguably, because the import of political branch failure to quash
state action turns on the ability and will of the political branches to police and
preempt such action. Scholars are divided as to the political branches’ preemptive ability and will. Compare Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1666–67, 1680–89
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less clear that the judiciary should engage in dormant preemp442
tion. If national uniformity is not consistently ideal, for example, it is easier to conclude that while the Constitution generally allocates the nation’s voice to the federal government, it
does not through that allocation “insist[] that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice,” uniform or other443
wise.
E. FUNCTIONAL FAILINGS
Having failed to accurately capture the Constitution either
as a matter of text, structure, and history or as a matter of
practice, the one-voice doctrine might yet survive in its functional form. Unfortunately, even from a functional perspective,
the one-voice doctrine is flawed. As evidenced above, whether
along separation of powers or federalist dimensions the onevoice doctrine in its functional form does not always lead to the
right answer. Functional considerations may favor one voice in
444
some circumstances but multiple voices in others. State action or the threat of rejection by a coordinate voice may ad445
vance U.S. foreign policy interests in certain contexts. The solution might be to downgrade the one-voice doctrine to a
rationale whose strength the courts might evaluate under the
circumstances of each case. Yet this solution quickly crumbles.
Once the doctrine is reduced to a rationale that may or may not
prevail in any given case, courts are left without consistent direction regarding whether to require, or secure, one-voiced ac446
tion.
Courts must make functional judgments regarding
(rejecting the notion that the political branches lack the will and capacity to
police state actions bearing on foreign affairs), with Swaine, supra note 8, at
1246–50 (arguing that Congress may under-protect foreign policy interests out
of solicitousness to the states).
442. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1666–67 (noting that the need for
dormant preemption rests on the assumption that “the federal political
branches desire exclusive control in” foreign affairs matters).
443. Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 13 (1986).
444. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1679–80 (noting that “the values to
be attached to the competing federalism and foreign relations interests appear
increasingly contested” such that the political branches preempt state law in
some contexts but not in others).
445. See supra text accompanying notes 338–59, 367–75.
446. Cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 32–34 & n.58 (recognizing
that the one-voice rationale does not provide courts with guidance—nor suggest judicial competence—to decide whether adjudicating or abstaining from
human rights litigation will embarrass the United States in its foreign affairs,
though also noting that courts have made such judgments in the past, especially on jurisdictional matters).
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whether a one-voice approach is best. The rationale does not
dictate whether those judgments should be made on a case-by447
case basis or for categories of cases.
Moreover, the rationale can serve multiple ends—the protection of U.S. foreign relations and the protection of the politi448
cal branches’ power to conduct foreign relations —
exacerbating the lack of guidance for the judiciary in evaluat449
ing one-voice arguments. These goals do not always point toward a one-voice solution, nor always point in the same direction. For example, in some cases accommodating state voices
might further national goals without forcing the political
branches to expressly endorse the states’ course of conduct, potentially securing both U.S. foreign affairs interests and political branch discretion. In other cases, preempting state voices
might protect political branch discretion to formulate foreign
policy but ultimately undermine national foreign affairs interests. Similarly, allowing a court to resolve an international law
dispute as to which the political branches are divided might
further U.S. foreign policy interests, but improperly elevate one
450
of the political branches. And the consequences might combine in additional ways. Courts are ill suited to decide on their
own the mix of goals that should prevail, not the least because
judicial fixing of goals infringes on political branch lawmaking
power, circumvents lawmaking procedures that protect state
451
interests, and “lacks democratic legitimacy.”
447. See id. at 32–33.
448. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1632–33 (discussing briefly the difference between these two ends). But cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5,
at 43 (identifying “the potential for embarrassment” as “the sine qua non of
‘one-voice’ deference”).
449. But cf. Abebe, supra note 384, at 49–50 (noting that courts make
judgments about “the consequences of their decisions on U.S. foreign policy
and the potential dangers of interfering with the political branches’ foreign
affairs prerogatives” in, for example, applying prudential doctrines like act of
state, political question, and comity). The judiciary is likely better suited to
decide one-voice arguments grounded in protecting political branch prerogatives than U.S. foreign policy interests as the former are guided in part by
judgments concerning the constitutional distribution of foreign affairs authority. However, protection of political branch power may also turn on an assessment of the course that would best preserve political branch discretion to pursue particular policies, in which case the distinction between the two goals
begins to fade.
450. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 35.
451. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1667, 1678; see also Chi. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (noting that foreign policy decisions “should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil”). But cf. Spiro, Federalism, su-
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Furthermore, once goals are chosen, courts lack competence to conduct the balancing required to reach those goals,
especially if the goals chosen include furthering substantive
452
U.S. foreign policy. By their own admission, courts are inferior to the political branches in deciding matters of foreign poli453
cy. Among other things, courts “generally lack foreign rela454
tions information and expertise.”
Judges typically are
455
generalists with no particular training in foreign relations.
On the information front, courts receive, from adverse parties
during the limited duration of a lawsuit, information gathered
and presented under restrictions imposed by discovery and evi456
dence rules. Further, in light of their number as well as the
delay and limited reach of appellate and especially Supreme
Court review, even federal courts are unlikely to achieve con-

pra note 105, at 1258 (“[S]tate interests of any magnitude are unlikely to justify the potentially high national costs of a disrupted foreign policy . . . .”).
452. But see Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1256 & n.139 (“[A] finding that state activity has crossed the constitutional line does not involve the
crafting of a federal rule or policy, but rather only the insulation of a rule developed by the political branches . . . .”).
453. See, e.g., Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111 (explaining that foreign policy
decisions “are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility”); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S.
349, 369 (2005) (quoting Waterman in noting the danger in having the judiciary predict foreign affairs consequences); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1701–
03 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has acknowledged incompetence to make, and has retreated from making, foreign policy judgments). But
cf. Knowles, supra note 9, at 127–38, 148–58 (arguing that courts can and
should engage foreign affairs issues in essentially the same way they engage
domestic issues); Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1253–58 & n.139 (arguing that judicial competence is a concern in deciding separation of powers, but
not federalism, questions in foreign affairs; that the courts are competent to
decide when state action “is likely to disrupt national foreign policy”; and that
the political branches require judicial assistance in policing state foreign affairs activity).
454. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1668.
455. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs
Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 543–44 (2011); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond
Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 186–87.
456. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting discovery generally to
“nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”); id. at
60(b)(2), (c)(1) (limiting the time and circumstances under which a court may
alter a judgment based on “newly discovered evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 401 (restricting relevant evidence to evidence regarding a “fact . . . of consequence in
determining the action”); Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 183, 194–95 (discussing
information limits of the judiciary).
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457

sistency, at least with any speed. And court decisions “must
deal in doctrines” justified by reasoning that is sensitive to
precedent such that decisions may not provide flexibility or re458
main current with altered circumstances.
Notwithstanding judicial incompetence to evaluate functional one-voice arguments, the prospect of foreign relations
doctrine moving to a place where these arguments are treated
459
as political questions is slim. Whatever the prospects, it is
clear that at most the functional one voice is a rationale to be
assessed case-by-case and not a doctrine to be applied reflexively. As a result, even the functional version of the one-voice doctrine cannot survive.
CONCLUSION
The one-voice doctrine is a frequent player in foreign relations law, having been invoked to answer critical questions regarding the foreign affairs powers of the President, Congress,
courts, and states. Until now, the doctrine has escaped comprehensive evaluation. Filling that void, this Article demonstrates
that the doctrine cannot withstand scrutiny. Not only is the
doctrine inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and
history, as well as actual practice, but the doctrine applies
along various dimensions that present divergent questions,
masks different theories of constitutional interpretation, and
ignores functional reasons for other or multiple voices in for457. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 455, at 542; Goldsmith, supra note 12,
at 1668, 1694–95; Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 187–89, 192–93; see also Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1695–98 & n.319 (providing examples of judicial inconsistency in making foreign affairs judgments).
458. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1668 (quoting Louis Henkin, The Foreign
Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 826
(1964)); see Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 183, 197.
459. From a historical perspective, this result might not be revolutionary.
Goldsmith argues that for much of U.S. history, judicial preemption in the absence of political branch action in foreign affairs—which would include
preemption based on one-voice arguments—was unknown. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1641–61, 1664, 1713. Nor does he find that changed circumstances warrant departure from this historical practice, or that judicial
preemption is a better option than leaving states to their own devices until the
political branches act to preempt. See id. at 1661–98. To the extent that abandonment of one-voice arguments and reasoning is perceived as too extreme,
the functional one-voice rationale in the federalism context might at least be
recast to require an analysis that courts are more competent to perform, such
as assessing whether state law is motivated by a foreign affairs goal. See id. at
1711. However, it is far from clear that such an assessment would identify
those state actions that merit preemption and only those actions.
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eign affairs. In light of these flaws, the one-voice doctrine
should be abandoned. At most it may be appropriate to argue
for a single federal voice in individual cases, but such arguments must be evaluated on their own. They cannot masquerade as part of a one-voice doctrine, for it is too much to believe
that there is or that we should retain such a thing.

